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Abstract

This study investigates the potential impact of the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
(BPCI) initiative from Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services on hospital performance and
behavior related to effectiveness and efficiency. The BPCI is under the Affordable Care Act and
provides hospitals with a fixed amount of reimbursement for a total episode of care. Building on
the agency theory, I argue that the BPCI initiative has the potential to enhance the effectiveness
and efficiency of hospital care. This quasi-experimental study examines the changes in hospital
care outcomes of patients with replacement of the lower extremity or sepsis in BPCIparticipating hospitals and their counterparts in non-participating hospitals. Based on the 2013–
2017 inpatient discharge data of Nevada, I apply the difference-in-differences modeling to
evaluate hospital care outcomes before and after BPCI initiative implementation. The study
produced mixed findings, with positive changes supporting my theoretical predictions and
hypotheses in the case of sepsis, but no changes detected in support for my theoretical
predictions and hypotheses for major joint replacement of the lower extremity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The increase in healthcare cost has dramatically outpaced general inflation in the United
States (U.S.). Cost and quality of health care delivery remain a focus for the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as they attempt to contain healthcare costs. This study
examines the impact of the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative on the
effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance. It is aligned with the focus of CMS on
effective health care delivery though implementation of the BPCI initiative.

Background
The steady increase in healthcare costs is a major concern for the U.S. economy as these
costs continuously outpace the general economy. Total national health expenditures increased
dramatically from $255.3 billion in 1980 to $3,337.2 billion in 2016 (Lassman et al., 2017;
Trendwatch: Chartbook 2018: Trends Affecting Hospital and Health Systems, 2018). The CMS
estimates that by 2026, national health spending will reach $5.7 trillion with an average growth
rate of 5.5% per year from 2017-2026. Healthcare expenditures were 17.9% of gross domestic
product (GDP) in 2016 and are projected to rise to 19.7% by 2026 (National Health Expenditure
Projections 2017-2026, 2017).
The CMS Office of the Actuary definition of national healthcare expenditures includes all
healthcare spending in the U.S. ("National Health Expenditure Accounts Methodology Paper,
2016: Definitions, Sources, and Methods," 2017). According to CMS data from 2017, more than
one-third of national healthcare expenditures were for hospital care (42.7% in 1980, 34% in 2016)
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followed by physician services (20.9% in 2016) (Trendwatch: Chartbook 2018: Trends Affecting
Hospital and Health Systems, 2018). More than 60% of hospital care expenditures were billed to
government health insurance programs: Medicare (47.2%, $182.7 billion) and Medicaid (15.6%,
$60.2 billion) ( Torio & Andrews, 2013). Medicare is a federal program that provides health
coverage for individuals 65 and older and those with severe disabilities regardless of income
levels. Medicaid is a state and federal program that provides health coverage to low-income
families. Most Medicare expenditures are for hospital care and the program is projected to
experience its greatest annual growth of 7.4% in the next few years, largely driven by Medicare
enrollment growth and an aging population (Cuckler et al., 2018).
Two of the greatest hospital costs are for treatment of major joint replacement of the
lower extremity (MJRL) and sepsis ( Torio & Moore, 2006). According to CMS data, MJRL is
the most common operation performed in hospitals and sepsis is the most common nonmaternal,
non-neonatal principal diagnosis among all conditions and the most expensive condition treated
in U.S. hospitals (AHRQ, 2015). In 2011, Medicare was a primary payer for 62% of inpatient
bills for sepsis ( Torio & Andrews, 2013).
There are several different reimbursement models for health services in the
healthcare system. The fee-for-service (FFS) model pays for services separately. It gives an
incentive for providers to offer more treatments because payment is dependent on the quantity of
care, rather than its quality. Therefore, unnecessary services are often provided and at an
increased cost to CMS. With the global capitation model, those making healthcare decisions
have a fixed budget. This gives them the incentive to provide quality care within their funding.
However, a lack of coordination in episodes of care has resulted in scrutiny of the model
(Froimson et al., 2013). There is a middle ground between FFS and global capitation to
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maximize patient-centered value by aligning payer and provider incentives. It is a bundled
payment model known as an episode-based payment (Froimson et al., 2013). In 2011, CMS
announced the BPCI initiative under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to reduce federal spending
while maintaining or enhancing the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries (CMS, 2017).
Evaluating how hospitals response to different reimbursement models is important to
health service and policy research. Examining effectiveness and efficiency of the BPCI initiative
helps better understand hospital behavior under a new value-based payment model from the
federal government. The most recent annual report of the BPCI initiative, Year 5, by the Lewin
Group found Medicare payments for MJRL declined significantly under the BPCI initiative
Model 2 (CMS, 2018b). This was based on Medicare claims and enrollment data from the fourth
quarters of 2011 through 2016 (CMS, 2018b). Research is limited on how a value-based payment
model might improve the effectiveness of care for a non-surgical clinical episode such as sepsis.
More work is needed to find the most effective alternative payment model to reduce the burden
of healthcare expenditures in the U.S. This is particularly relevant for conditions that cause the
highest hospital expenditures, MJRL and sepsis.

Purpose of the Study
Given that CMS announced the BPCI initiative under the ACA, the BPCI initiative has
been implemented since 2013 and effectiveness of the BPCI initiative needs to be analyzed. The
purpose of this study is to examine potential impact of the BPCI initiative on hospital
performance in Nevada. This is a quantitative, quasi-experimental study based on secondary data
designed to (a) examine the effectiveness of the BPCI initiatives on BPCI-participating hospitals,
and (b) examine the efficiency of the BPCI initiatives on these hospitals over the same period.
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Research Questions
This study addresses the following research questions:
1. Does the BPCI initiative have positive effects on the effectiveness of hospital
performance for MJRL and care of sepsis?
2. Does the BPCI initiative have positive effects on the efficiency of hospital
performance for MJRL and care of sepsis?

Theoretical Framework
This study uses agency theory to understand hospital organizational behavior and
performance under the CMS BPCI initiative (Figure 1). Agency theory explains the performance
of a hospital under the BPCI initiative on health care delivery for both surgical and non-surgical
medical care. In summary, the agency theory is a reflection of the relationships of effectiveness
and efficiency with the implementation of the BPCI initiative. There are two hypotheses:
Ha: The BPCI initiative participating hospitals are more likely to improve effectiveness
of hospital care than non-participating hospitals.
Hb: The BPCI initiative participating hospitals are more likely to improve efficiency of
hospital care than non-participating hospitals.

Significance of the Study
This study uses State Inpatient Databases of Nevada (SIDN) data to provide empirical
evidence on the performance of hospitals under the BPCI initiative.
My research addresses several gaps in the literature. First, it determines if the BPCI
initiative has affected hospital performance based on a longer pre- and post-intervention period.
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Published research results are usually limited to short-term outcomes. There is some evidence,
based on short post-implementation of the bundled payment data, that bundled payment reduces
the cost of unnecessary or duplicative services and improves care coordination (Dundon et al.,
2016; Froemke et al., 2015). Little information is available, however, on the effectiveness of the
BPCI initiative over a longer period. Second, this research will add to current literature
examining effects of the BPCI initiative for medical care by showing positive effects of the BPCI
initiative on hospital performance for sepsis. Third, it will add to the existing literature by
providing a more comprehensive picture of the association between the BPCI initiative and
quality of hospital performance. Several studies have examined the association between the
BPCI initiative and quality of care in terms of readmission, emergency department (ED) visits,
length of in-hospital stays (LOS), and mortality (Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards, Mears, & Barnes,
2017; Froemke et al., 2015; Iorio et al., 2016; Navathe et al., 2017). This study expands the
examination of complications as a part of the performance measurement. Finally, my study uses
the most recent data available. Although the study is based on the data of only one state, Nevada,
its findings still improve our understanding of hospital performance responding to a value-based
payment model from CMS, the bundled payment.

Summary
This chapter describes the purpose, background, and significance of the study. A
summary of the theoretical framework of agency theory, the basis of this research, is also
presented. Hospital performance is studied from the aspects of effectiveness and efficiency.
Chapter two is a comprehensive literature review of the BPCI initiative and hospital performance
on orthopedic surgery and sepsis. Chapter three discusses the conceptual framework, including
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relationships among the constructs as well as the hypotheses of the framework. Chapter four
contains comprehensive information of the methods used in this study, expanding the research
questions and hypotheses to include statistical analysis. It also explains the research design and
sample, measurements of variables, and analytical approaches. Chapter five presents the results
of the study and Chapter six discusses the findings of this study. The last chapter also offers
directions for future research, implications for public health policy and interventions, and
discusses assumptions and limitations of the study. Terms used in this study are defined in
Appendix B.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

Introduction
The purpose of the review is three-fold. First, previous studies on the effects of bundled
payments on hospital outcomes are presented. Second, methodological issues pertaining to the
existing literature, as well as other literature gaps, are reviewed. Third the review identifies
pertinent indicators used in the conceptual framework presented in the next chapter.
To achieve the above purpose, several questions are addressed: (a) Does the BPCI
initiative remain effective for a period longer than reported in previous studies? (b) Is the BPCI
initiative effective for medical conditions? (c) Does using a different quality indicator support
current studies that determined there were no quality changes under the BPCI initiative? (d) If
there were any changes in hospital performance under the BPCI initiative, which organizational
theory could best explain them? Since Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity (MJRL)
and sepsis are chosen as tracer conditions for this study, the chapter begins with descriptions of
MJRL and sepsis. The second section reviews health services reimbursement models and the
BPCI initiative under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The third section
explains relationships between the bundled payment reimbursement and hospital performance.
The sources used for the literature review were: Pub Med, Google Scholar, Kopernio database,
publications listed on the CDC website, and a review of selected journal article citations. Finally,
a summary of the major points revealed by the literature review is presented.

The Clinical Procedure and Condition Selected for the Study
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Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity.
Major joint replacement of the lower extremity (MJRL) is one of 48 episodes of care
covered by the BPCI initiative of CMS (Appendix A). MJRL is total joint arthroplasty (TJA) and
includes both total knee arthroplasty (TKA) and total hip arthroplasty (THA). Arthroplasty is a
surgical procedure to restore the function of a joint by either resurfacing the bones or by using an
artificial joint. TKA either resurfaces a knee damaged by arthritis or uses artificial parts to cap
the ends of the bones. It is typically performed on patients with severe knee arthritis (Cram et al.,
2012; "Knee Replacement Surgery Procedure," 2018). THA is used to replace a hip joint with an
artificial one. TJA is the most common elective surgical procedure in the U.S. and the greatest
surgical expenditure for patients with Medicare (Cutler & Ghosh, 2012). In a longitudinal study
between 1991 and 2001, Cram et al. (2012) showed a rapid increase of primary TKA both in
volume (161.5% increase from 93,232 in 1991 to 243,802 in 2010) and in per capital utilization
(99.2% increase, 31.2 procedures per 10,000 Medicare enrollees in 1991 to 62.1 procedures per
100,000 in 2010). The incidence of TKA itself is projected to increase in the U.S. from 500,000
in 2005 to 3.48 million by 2030. The annual incidence of joint replacement procedures is
projected to increase considerably among aging “baby boomers” (Nichols & Vose, 2016). A
majority of TJA patients are white, female, and 65 or older with Medicare insurance (Molloy,
Martin, Moschetti, & Jevsevar, 2017; Nichols & Vose, 2016; Nwachukwu, McCormick,
Provencher, Roche, & Rubash, 2015)
There has been a consistent decrease in length of stay (LOS) after TJA surgery (Cram et
al., 2012). Two questions have been raised regarding the reduction in LOS, as many U.S.
hospitals are adopting the bundled payment reimbursement model. First, there are concerns about
an association between shorter LOS and the potential need for more frequent post-discharge care
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or readmission. One study from a Medicare Part A data file analysis of TKAs between 1991 and
2010, observed a significant decrease in hospital LOS and an increase in hospital readmission
rates (Cram et al., 2012). Conversely, Regenbogen et al. (2017) found no evidence among
Medicare claims between 2009 and 2012 that a shorter LOS was more likely associated with
frequent post-discharge care or readmission. Second, a shorter LOS after surgery might reduce
the total cost of care. There are mixed findings in different datasets about cost of care and LOS.
One study showed a shorter LOS was associated with lower total surgical payments from
analyzing Medicare claims between 2009 and 2012 (Regenbogen et al., 2017). According to
Molloy et al. (2017), hospital costs for TJA increased consistently even though LOS decreased.
Molloy et al. (2017) used data from National Inpatient Sample from 2002 and 2013 and found a
greater increase in mean hospital cost for both TKA (52.4%) and THA (49.8%) and a reduction
in LOS from 4.06 to 2.97 days.
There was a change in the trend of patient discharges between 1991 and 2010. More
patients were discharged to outpatient rehabilitation in lieu of inpatient rehabilitation (Cram et al.,
2012). Post-discharge costs, including readmission costs, are requisite components of the total
cost of TJA. In one estimate, initial hospitalization accounted for only about 55% of the total cost,
and Medicare spent about $6 billion during the 90-day post-acute period in 2013 (Mechanic,
2015). Bozic et al. (2014) found that post-discharge payments accounted for 36% of total
payments. Approximately 49% of patients were transferred to a post-acute care (PAC) facility,
such as a skilled nursing facility (SNF), acute rehabilitation facility, or home health services
(HHS), which accounted for 70% of post-discharge payments (Bozic, Ward, Vail, & Maze,
2014). Another study supported the finding that using a PAC facility was a significant variable in
the total cost of care, as 77.0 % of patients used PAC services following surgery (Snow et al.,
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2014). Studies on costs associated with patient discharge and 90-day readmission support a
substantial variation in costs depending on the care pathway: whether a patient is released to
SNF after TJA surgery or readmitted in 90 days (Nichols & Vose, 2016; Patient Safety
Indicators overview; Tsai et al., 2016). As a result, the most expensive scenario was 1.8 to 2.2
times higher than the lowest cost scenario based on healthcare claims (Nichols & Vose, 2016).
The trend to discharge more patients to their homes instead of SNFs after TJA procedure has
increased significantly from 15% in 1998 to 35% in 2009 (Ong, Lotke, Lau, Manley, & Kurtz,
2015).
MJRL is a suitable group of surgeries for bundled payment models since it is elective,
relatively standardized, and subject to a comparatively low spending variation (Mechanic, 2015).
In addition, MJRL varies widely in both cost and quality, though it occurs in high volumes and
relatively homogeneous patient populations. Bozic et al. (2014) analyzed 250 Medicare
beneficiaries undergoing MJRL at a single hospital over a 12-month period and found bundled
payments for MJRL varied depending on patient comorbidities and complications, discharge
disposition, and readmission rates. Medicare reimbursements for MJRL are highly variable
depending on geographical region, patient volume, health of the patient population, and
government ownership of a hospital. These are other important driving forces affecting valuebased bundled payments. Based on CMS inpatient charges and reimbursement data, authors
found higher reimbursements were correlated with lower patient volume, a healthier patient
population, lower cost efficiency, lower quality, and government ownership (Padegimas et al.,
2016).
The BPCI initiative classifies joint replacement according to whether or not patients have
major complications or coexisting conditions. This classification forms the foundation for the
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Medical Severity Diagnosis-Related Groups (MS-DRGs). MS-DRG 469 is for MJRL patients
with major complications or coexisting conditions and MS-DRG 470 is for MJRL patients
without complications (Appendix A).

Sepsis.
Sepsis is a serious medical condition caused by an overwhelming, life-threatening
immune response to infection ("Sepsis," 2018). Sepsis is a substantial burden on the U.S.
healthcare system. The mean age of sepsis patients is 65 years (Paoli et al., 2018; Rhee et al.,
2017). It is a leading cause of in-hospital death and the most frequent and expensive condition
treated in U.S. hospitals. With a continuous increase in the incidence of sepsis, sepsis-associated
hospital stays almost tripled between 2005 and 2014 (McDermott, 2017; Stoller et al., 2016). A
number of studies were conducted using retrospective databases to examine temporal trends on
the incidence of sepsis and in-hospital death. The incidence of sepsis increased, but in-hospital
mortality consistently decreased from 2000 to 2012, based on the International Classification of
Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD- 9-CM) codes from National Inpatient
Sample data (Stevenson, Rubenstein, Radin, Wiener, & Walkey, 2014; Stoller et al., 2016).
However, it is unclear whether the rise in incidence and decrease in in-hospital mortality were
true, or whether the reported outcomes were artifacts due to changes in coding and discharge
practices. As coding practices became more inclusive, it might have resulted in an increased
awareness and diagnosis of sepsis. A reduction of in-hospital mortality may be an outcome of
discharging patients to long-term acute care facilities prior to in-hospital death. However,
concerns over the reliability of studies based on claim data were reduced when studies using
clinical data sets reported the same trends of decreasing in-hospital mortality for sepsis (Rhee et
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al., 2017; Stevenson et al., 2014).
There was a decrease in LOS from 17.3 to 7 days over the 12-year period from 2000–
2012, and home discharges have increased steadily since then, regardless of the severity of sepsis
(Paoli, Reynolds, Sinha, Gitlin, & Crouser, 2018; Stoller et al., 2016). Studies also have reported
that more than 40% of patients are discharged to SNFs or intermediate care facilities rather than
home or HHS (Rhee et al., 2017; Stoller et al., 2016). There has been a slight increase in home
discharge but discharge to SNFs remains the same. Different from surgical conditions, studies
found that increased LOS for medical conditions was highly associated with reduced rates of
early hospital death and fewer readmissions (Eapen et al., 2013; Southern & Arnsten, 2015;
Stukel et al., 2012).
Sepsis differs from MJRL in that it is not diagnosed until after admission. There is also
more than one therapeutic intervention for sepsis, which must target different pathways due to
variability in the pathogenesis of sepsis (Khan & Divatia, 2010; Paoli et al., 2018). Early GoalDirected Therapy (EGDT) is a protocol that manages sepsis during the six hours following
diagnosis. Rivers et al. (2001) found significant benefits in outcomes for patients with sepsis
assigned to EGDT. Timing of the diagnosis of sepsis and early treatment are critical to clinical
outcomes and financial burdens. When sepsis was not diagnosed on hospital admission, the total
cost of sepsis treatment was much higher: $51,022 if undiagnosed compared to $18,023 when
diagnosed on admission (Paoli et al., 2018). The Institute for Healthcare Improvement and CMS
proposed sepsis care bundles based on EGDT in 2004. The goal was to improve uniformity and
universality of sepsis treatment by reducing the variability in clinical practice (Jozwiak, Monnet,
& Teboul, 2016; Khan & Divatia, 2010; Paoli et al., 2018). Bundled care processes established a
shared clinical baseline, standardizing interventions to reduce variation among clinicians (Miller

12

et al., 2013). A sepsis care bundle is a group of therapies built around evidence-based guidelines
rather than individual therapies. Numerous studies have shown the effectiveness of these bundles
(Khan & Divatia, 2010; Levy et al., 2004) as in-hospital mortality and LOS have decreased
(Castellanos-Ortega et al., 2010; Girardis et al., 2009; Levy et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2013;
Noritomi et al., 2014). Additionally, the cost of care per patient has decreased as the condition of
patients improved (Noritomi et al., 2014). However, the use of sepsis care bundles is low, with a
compliance of about 5% (Jozwiak et al., 2016). Therefore, including sepsis in the BPCI initiative
was in line with its goal: to produce higher quality, more coordinated care at a lower cost to
Medicare.
The BPCI initiative classifies sepsis in three categories depending on use of mechanical
ventilation and the presence of complications. MS-DRG 870 is septicemia or severe sepsis and
the use of mechanical ventilation for more than 96 hours. MS-DRG 871 is septicemia or severe
sepsis, using mechanical ventilation for more than 96 hours, plus major complications or
comorbidity. MS-DRG 872 is septicemia or severe sepsis without using mechanical ventilation
for more than 96 hours and without major complications or comorbidity (Appendix A).

Bundled Payments Mechanism and the CMS Initiative

Bundled payments.
Bundled payments, or episode of care payments, are value-based payment models. The
payer makes a single payment to providers and healthcare facilities for all the healthcare services
performed to treat a patient for a certain condition within a defined period of time. Bundled
payments are an incentive to provide quality-of-care services and move away from an emphasis
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on quantity of care. Providing care within a single payment per patient can reduce unnecessary
tests and procedures. Ways of reducing excessive spending may include reducing factors that
lead to prolonged inpatient stays and omitting redundancy and waste of medical supplies and
employee time (Mechanic, 2015; Tsai et al., 2016). Conventionally, Medicare uses a FFS
payment model that makes separate payments to providers for each service they perform during a
course of treatment. The FFS approach rewards quantity of services rather than quality of care,
resulting in duplicate and unnecessary diagnostic procedures (Tsai & Miller, 2015). Alternatively,
bundled payments set a fixed reimbursement amount to be shared among all providers:
physicians, allied health professionals, hospitals, and other facilities. This approach prevents
fragmented care, provides minimal coordination across health care settings, and requires
hospitals and physicians to work collaboratively to manage costs and processes from a single
pool of resources.
Surgical inpatient care is about 40% of all hospital and physician bills to Medicare. With
a prospective payment system, hospitals and their physicians continue to be paid for each unit of
service for any adverse outcomes after the surgery, in addition to fixed payments from Medicare.
Analysis of Medicare data for four of the most common types of inpatient surgical care,
including hip surgery, showed hospital payments provided the greatest variability and were
responsible for the biggest share of payments overall among hospitals (Birkmeyer et al., 2010).

CMS episode-based Bundled Payment Programs.

Acute Care Episode (ACE) Demonstration: 2009 – 2012.
The Inpatient Prospective Payment System and Medicare Physician Fee Schedule are the
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payment systems CMS uses for hospitals (Part A) and physicians (Part B) during an inpatient
stay. In the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, a number of relative value units for each
procedure determine a payment level for each procedure. Physician work is the largest
component of a relative value unit and it’s defined as the time, intensity, and skill required to
perform a service (Urwin et al., 2019).
In 2009, Medicare introduced the ACE Demonstration project under section 646 of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Monetization Act of 2003. Its purpose was to test
the use of a bundled payment for inpatient episodes of care for orthopedic and cardiovascular
surgery (CMS, 2010). Under the ACE Demonstration, Medicare made a single payment to
hospitals for both hospital and physician services provided during an inpatient day. Specifically,
ACE Demonstration tested the effect of bundling Part A and Part B payments for episodes of
acute care. It was a three-year pilot program limited to five sites in four states: Texas, Oklahoma,
New Mexico, and Colorado. In terms of gainsharing, Medicare shared savings up to a maximum
of the annual Part B premium with beneficiaries who participated in the ACE Demonstration.
Medicare also shared savings with participating hospital-physician partnerships if profits were
realized. To be able to gainshare, hospital-physician partnerships agreed to an average 5%
discount in DRG payments from CMS (Rana & Bozic, 2015).
In summary, the ACE Demonstration was a pilot program to test bundling hospital (Part
A) and physician (Part B) payments for episodes of acute care. However, post-acute care
payments were not included in the ACE Demonstration. With this program, most of the studies
showed a decrease in the overall cost per orthopedic surgery episode by reducing LOS and
implant prices, and gainsharing with physicians was possible (CMS, 2010; Davis, 2010; Rana &
Bozic, 2015). The CMS final evaluation report on ACE Demonstration stated reduction in cost of
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care and LOS with containing quality of care (Urdapilleta et al., 2013).

Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative: 2013 –2018.
In 2011, CMS announced the BPCI initiative under section 3021 of the Patient Protection
and ACA with an emphasis on efficiency and quality of care, by shifting FFS Medicare payment
models toward value-based models (Dundon et al., 2016; Perla et al., 2018; Tsai, Joynt, Wild,
Orav, & Jha, 2015). The Initiative is a voluntary participation that allows participants to choose
among different models as well as among 48 clinical episodes (Appendix A). The Medicare
Severity-Diagnosis Related Group (MS-DRG) of qualifying hospitalization defined the clinical
episodes. The initiative has included 1,201 hospitals and the most popular episode among
participating hospitals was MJRL. The BPCI initiative began in 2013 and providers could
terminate their participation at any time. One of the objectives of the BPCI initiative was to make
hospitals and physicians financially accountable not only for inpatient care but also for postdischarge care, and allow gainsharing between hospitals and physicians across services by
aligning stakeholders’ incentives (Rana & Bozic, 2015).
The BPCI initiative is a three-year program composed of four innovative models defined
by different episodes of care (Table 1). In Model 1, the episode of care includes all MS-DRGs
for the inpatient stay in an acute care hospital, like the ACE Demonstration. Medicare paid a
reduced amount to hospitals based on rates from the original Medicare program’s Inpatient
Prospective Payment System. Physicians were paid by Medicare based on the Medicare
Physician Fee Schedule (CMS, 2017a). The first and second cohort of Awardees in Model 1
began in April 2013 and January 2014 and concluded on March 31, 2016 and December 31,
2016, respectively. Models 1, 2, and 3 involved a retrospective bundling model that reconciled
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actual payments against a target price (CMS, 2017b, 2017c; Kivlahan et al., 2016; Mechanic,
2015; Rana & Bozic, 2015; Tsai et al., 2015). For Model 2, the target price for each selected
episode was set at a two- to 3-percent discount based on three years of Medicare claims data for
the participants (Tsai et al., 2015). Two percent was applied to 30- and 60-day bundles and three
percent was applied to 90-day bundles. BPCI initiative participating hospitals could determine
their recalculated target prices at the end of each quarter (Mechanic, 2015). A participant would
receive additional payments as an incentive if actual payments were less than the target price;
otherwise participants were responsible for refunding the excess to CMS as a penalty. An
episode of care in Model 2 included a Medicare beneficiary’s inpatient stay in an acute care
hospital, post-acute care, and all related services during the episode of care. This period ended 30,
60, or 90 days after hospital discharge based on the 48 different clinical episodes. Section 1861(i)
of the Social Security Act includes a 3-day inpatient hospital stay prior to receiving SNF services
covered by Medicare Part A. For Model 2 participants, this requirement was waived upon a
hospital’s request (CMS, 2017b; Nichols & Vose, 2016). The first cohort of BPCI participants
began on October 1, 2013 and the second on January 1, 2014. Additional cohorts began on
January 1, April 1, and July 1, 2015, and the BPCI initiative was extended until September 30,
2018 for Models 2, 3, and 4. As of July 1, 2018, 253 acute-care hospitals and 152 physician
group practices had participated in BPCI initiative Model 2. Model 3 involved only the postacute period following discharge from the hospital for selected DRGs (Table 1). It covered SNF,
HHS, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, physician group practices, and long-term-care hospitals
(CMS, 2017c). Model 4 was a single, prospective, bundled payment for both hospital and
physicians. It covered the acute inpatient stay and related 30-day readmissions after hospital
discharge for selected DRGs. The first cohorts of participants in Models 3 and 4 began in
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October 2013. As of July 1, 2018, the BPCI Model 4 had two participants in Phase 2.
There were two phases of the BPCI initiative for Models 2, 3, and 4. Phase 1 was the
preparation period where CMS and its participants plan implementation of the BPCI and accept
the financial risk. To remain in the BPCI, a participating organization must transit at least one
clinical episode among the 48 to Phase 2 by July 1, 2015. Phase 1 ended on September 30, 2015
and the transition to Phase 2 of all clinical episodes for all participants was completed. Phase 2
was a risk-bearing phase. It was a three-year period of performance for each clinical episode.
Phase 2 was extended until September 30, 2018, allowing awardees to extend their period of
performance for all clinical episodes for up to two years. As of July 2018, Phase 2 of the BPCI
initiative had 1,025 participants composed of 206 Awardees and 819 Episode Initiators (CMS,
2017d). MJRL was the most common condition among hospitals that participated in Phase 2 of
the BPCI initiative (Tsai et al., 2015).

BPCI Initiative Model 2
An episode payment is defined by the length of time covered and range of providers and
services included for a single episode of care (CHQPR, 2015). The BPCI initiative Model 2 has
the most comprehensive bundle, including all related providers and services for a single patient
for a single episode of care, from the starting point to up to 90 days after discharge. Model 2
includes four different time stages: pre-admission, hospitalization, post-acute care, and
readmission or complication from the same episode of care up to 90-days following discharge
from the hospital (Figure 2) (CHQPR, 2015). The episode starts when a beneficiary is admitted
to or visited by an episode-initiating acute-care hospital or a physician. All related professional
services provided by a primary care physician (PCP), surgeon or other specialist, in addition to
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imaging services and drugs, are included in the pre-admission stage. For example, a Medicare
beneficiary visits a PCP for hip pain and the PCP refers him or her to an orthopedic specialist.
The orthopedic surgeon or the PCP orders imaging and blood tests and the patient is prescribed
drugs to ease the pain. If the orthopedic surgeon determines the patient needs a MJRL and the
patient agrees to the surgery, the patient is admitted to a hospital. During hospitalization, an
anesthesiologist, orthopedic surgeon, radiologist, and hospital staff are involved in the surgical
intervention. Implants, blood transfusion, other devices, and drugs used in surgery are services
included during hospitalization. If the patient is discharged to a PAC facility, such as a
rehabilitation facility, plus long-term care after the MJRL procedure, expenses for other
specialists and related staff are also covered under the Model 2 bundled payments. Home care
and a PCP care manager, plus services provided during the PAC such as imaging and drugs, are
included in the Model 2 bundled payments. Since the BPCI initiative Model 2 extends for 90
days, if the patient is readmitted to the hospital for the same MJRL-related care, all expenses
during readmission are included in a bundled payment.
According to the Lewin Group (CMS, 2018b) analysis of Awardee-submitted data,
physicians, physician group practices, hospitals, institutional PACs, and home health agencies
are the most common gainsharing partners to receive net payment reconciliation and internal cost
savings under Model 2. Physicians receive 88.3% of a gainsharing distribution. Of these, most
are orthopedic surgeons. From Quarter 4, 2013 through Quarter 2, 2017, each orthopedic surgeon
received $23,005 in net reconciliation and averaged $15, 087 in internal cost savings. The
amount of the payments received by the different providers under Model 2 is unknown, since
their financial arrangements are specified in each “Awardees” agreement with CMS. To ensure
quality of care, CMS assesses the patient’s experience of the care and health outcomes by
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analyzing claims and quality reporting from the Awardees, including surveys and patientassessment tools. In order to examine the effects of bundled payments, assessment and
monitoring activities and data collection efforts are required for BPCI initiative participating
hospitals. Number of ED visits, mortality, and readmissions are used to determine quality of
care by the CMS Annual report on the BPCI initiative (CMS, 2018b).

Relationship between Bundled Payments and Hospital Performance
In the most recent annual report for the BPCI initiative Year 5, the Lewin Group (CMS,
2018b) found Medicare payments under the BPCI initiative Model 2 declined considerably for
24 of the 32 hospital-initiated clinical episodes analyzed, with little changes in quality of care.
This report used a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method based on Medicare claims and
enrollment data from the baseline period, Quarter 4, 2011, through Quarter 3, 2012, to the
intervention period, Quarter 4, 2013, through Quarter 4, 2016. Declines in the use of PAC
facilities were primarily attributed to Medicare payment reductions. Savings for the Medicare
program under Initiative Model 2, however, were not realized overall after reconciliation
payments were made to the other participants. Under Model 2, the Initiative resulted in a net loss
to Medicare of $202.1 million from Quarter 4 2011 to Quarter 4 2016.

Bundled payments and episodes of care.
Joynt Maddox et al. (2018) examined the effect of five medical conditions in the BPCI
initiative: congestive heart failure, pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),
sepsis, and acute myocardial infarction. Based on Medicare claims from 2013 through 2015, they
found no significant changes in Medicare payments, LOS, ED use, 30- or 90-day hospital
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readmissions, or mortality for these five medical conditions. Their finding supports earlier
studies on the efficacy of BPCI intervention for COPD by Bhatt et al. (2017). The Medicare
BPCI initiative did not reduce overall costs or 30-day readmission rates even though COPD
patients under the initiative were more likely to receive effective hospital care through regular
follow-up calls and pulmonary clinic visits than COPD patients treated at non-participating
hospitals (Bhatt et al., 2017). Early results from the Lewin Group reported similar financial
outcomes for the cardiovascular surgery episode between October 2013 and September 2014.
The Lewin Group (CMS, 2018b) reported no significant changes for inpatient hospital
LOS or for patients discharged to PAC facilities across all clinical episodes during the BPCI
initiative. Regarding discharge locations among patients receiving PAC, the use of institutional
PAC declined significantly for 13 clinical episodes: cardiac valve replacement; coronary artery
bypass graft; esophagitis, gastroenteritis and other digestive disorders; fractures of the femur, hip
or pelvis; MJRL; nutritional metabolic disorders, other reparatory, revision of MJRL; sepsis;
simple pneumonia and respiratory infections; transient ischemia; and urinary tract infection.
Quality of care did not change under Model 2 according to the Lewin Group (CMS,
2018b). The mortality rate declined for more than half of the clinical episodes in BPCIparticipating hospitals, except for coronary artery bypass grafts. The use of EDs during the 90
days after discharge from the hospital decreased significantly for major joint replacement of the
upper extremity, stroke, syncope, and collapse. The results for 90-day readmission rates were
mixed. Compared to the baseline period, there was an increase in readmission rates among
clinical episodes for: fractures of the femur, hip or pelvis, and revisions of the hip or knee;
gastrointestinal obstruction; and percutaneous coronary intervention. There were two episodes of
care with a statistically significant decrease in the 90-day readmission rates: esophagitis,
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gastroenteritis and other digestive disorders; and spinal fusion.

Bundled payments and orthopedic surgery.

Cost of care.
Many studies show positive financial outcomes for the BPCI initiative Model 2 and the
MJRL episode of care. The recent BPCI initiative Year 5 annual report by the Lewin Group
(CMS, 2018b) found that Medicare payments for MJRL declined significantly under Model 2.
The Group used the DiD method based on Medicare claims and enrollment data from Quarter 4,
2011 through Quarter 4, 2016. Declines in PAC were the main contribution in reducing Medicare
payments. Dummit et al. (2016) evaluated the association between hospitals participating in the
BPCI initiative and Medicare payments for quality of care. For the baseline period from October
2011 to September 2012 and an intervention period from October 2013 to June 2015, they
estimated the difference in outcomes for Medicare FFS beneficiaries. Results showed that
Medicare payments were $1,166 lower for BPCI-participating hospitals. These savings were
primarily due to a reduction in institutional PAC, with no important change in readmissions, ED
visits, or mortality. Another study of CMS claim data for a single hospital from the first and
second quarter of 2013 showed a 10% Medicare cost reduction under the BPCI initiative
compared to the July 2009 to June 2012 baseline period and the target price (Iorio et al., 2016).
Edwards and et al. (2017) studied the same Medical claim data for a three-year baseline period,
2009 to 2012. Costs were usually greater for revision TJAs than primary TJAs, mainly because
of a mixed patient population, more complications, and a greater complexity of surgical
interventions. Courtney and others (2016) compared revision TJA patients in bundled and
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nonbundled groups from one hospital system using CMS data between October 2013 and March
2015. There were no differences in total costs to CMS, however, between revision TJA before or
after the BPCI initiative (Courtney, Ashley, Hume, & Kamath, 2016).
Post-acute care and hospital readmissions are two prime areas of opportunity for
meaningful cost reductions (Kivlahan et al., 2016). CMS claims data for 27 BPCI initiativeparticipating teaching hospitals showed that PAC (SNF, home health agency, inpatient rehab,
and inpatient psych) comprised 67% of post-discharge payments for the MJRL episode of care
with 22% attributable to readmissions (Kivlahan et al., 2016). The average Medicare payment
per episode for inpatient rehabilitation (IP Rehab) dropped from $5,000 and $8,000 during the
baseline years of 2009 to 2012, to about $1,000 after participating in the BPCI initiative from
2013 to 2014. A steady increase in home health use was credited with the rapid decrease in the
use of IP Rehab. Results from the CMS final reports were similar. The Lewin Group reported
that lower PAC payments and increased HHA payments led to reductions in total Medicare
payments for MJRL (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year
5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018).
Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina was a payer employed in a value-based
reimbursement model for MJRL. The MJRL bundle included hospital admission, surgery,
anesthesia, physician fees, the implant device, facility fees, lab tests, care coordinator, and all
PAC up to 90-days. The payer reported 8–10% savings from bundling in 2011. Unbundled
MJRL costs were between $25,000 and $43,000 and decreased to $22,000 to $30,000 when the
total costs were bundled (Action Plan for Bundled Payments, 2015).

Length of in-hospital stay.
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The 2018 annual report on the BPCI initiative supports other studies on the effect of
Model 2 on LOS for MJRL (Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Iorio et al., 2016). The
report indicates reductions in LOS among Model 2-participating hospitals compared to nonparticipating hospitals (CMS, 2018b). Iorio and et al. (2016) found that LOS decreased from 4.27
to 3.38 days in a single hospital based on Medicare data. Another study also reported a decrease
in LOS from 3.81 to 2.57 days using the same Medicare claims data but analyzing a longer
intervention period, from October 2013 to September 2014. A reduced LOS from 5.27 to 4.02
days also occurred among patients who had revision MJRL surgeries (Courtney et al., 2016).

Outcome of care.
Many studies have indicated that the BPCI initiative reduced payments for the MJRL
episode with no changes in quality of care ((Doran & Zabinski, 2015; Dummit et al., 2016;
Edwards et al., 2017; Iorio et al., 2016; Siddiqi et al., 2017). With a significant reduction in LOS
among Model 2-participating hospitals, there were concerns of an increase in PAC discharge and
readmission rates in exchange for shorter hospital stays. However, earlier studies on the BPCI
initiative showed a reduction in LOS was not associated with SNF discharge and readmission
rates. A study comparing the first and third years of the Initiative at a single academic hospital
from 2013 to 2015 found reduced rates of discharging patients to inpatient facilities and a
reduction in readmissions (Dundon et al., 2016). Discharges to home health care increased by 23%
along with an 88% cost reduction in IP Rehab. Iorio and et al. (2016) found a reduction in
discharges to inpatient facilities. Their study showed a higher portion of readmitted patients were
those discharged to facility-based settings rather than patients discharged to home health
assistance or self-care (Iorio et al., 2016). Edward et al. (2017) reported a decrease in 90-day
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readmissions from 16 to 10%, with a 23% reduction in the average cost of readmissions
(Edwards et al., 2017). The Lewin Group report also supported the current findings of a PAC
discharge reduction for MJRL under initiative Model 2 (CMS, 2018b). However, findings from
different studies were mixed regarding quality of care and outcomes such as ED use and
mortality rate. The Lewin group found no significant changes in these measures under Model 2.
Navathe and et al. (2018) provided a more complete view of the effects of the Model 2
BPCI initiative on cost reduction by comparing it to the ACE Demonstration. ACE and the BPCI
initiative are both bundled payment reimbursement models, except ACE doesn’t include postacute care. Their study analyzed Medicare claims and internal cost data from a healthcare system
that participated in both ACE and the BPCI initiative. Hospitals participating in both ACE and
the BPCI initiative had a decrease in LOS and in the cost for both DRG 469 and DRG 470. There
were no major differences in the number of ED visits or 30-day readmissions after the surgery.
However, only BPCI initiative-participating hospitals had a decline in average PAC spending of
$2,442.12, or 27% per case (Navathe, Liao, Polsky, et al., 2018).

Bundled payment and sepsis.

Cost of care.
A study by Joynt Maddox et al. (2018) examined effects of the BPCI initiative on the
individual components of payment that included total 90-day Medicare payments, payments for
readmissions, skilled nursing, IP Rehab, long-term care hospitals, home health agencies,
physician fees, and non-physician outpatient fees for sepsis. From DiD analyses of Medicare
claims from 2013 through 2015, they found no significant changes in Medicare payments at
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BPCI-participating hospitals compared with comparison (non-participating) hospitals (Joynt
Maddox, Orav, Zheng, & Epstein, 2018). Findings from the Lewin Group reported no marked
changes in total Medicare payments at BPCI-participating hospitals although there was a sizable
decrease in Medicare payments for SNF (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018).
A non-research article reported a successful Medicare bundle for sepsis at the St. Joseph
Health System in South Bend, Indiana (Meyer, 2018). St. Joseph adopted evidence-based clinical
pathways for sepsis that allowed better ED and inpatient care during the first six hours after
sepsis was diagnosed. As a result, patients were more likely to be directly discharged to home
rather than to a SNF. With a decrease in the use of SNFs, St. Joseph was able to cut costs and
meet the bundled payment target.

Length of in-hospital stay.
The BPCI 2018 annual report from the Lewin Group supported Joynt Maddox’s findings
that there was no significant changes in LOS for sepsis at BPCI-participating hospitals relative to
non-participating hospitals comparing before and after the BPCI initiative (CMS, 2018b; Joynt
Maddox et al., 2018).

Outcome of care.
Two empirical studies on effects of the BPCI initiative for sepsis measured changes in
outcomes of ED use, readmissions, and mortality between BPCI-participating and comparison
hospitals. Joynt Maddox and et al. (2018) and the Lewin Group (CMS, 2018b) observed no
differences in ED use, hospital readmissions, or mortality between participating and non-
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participating hospitals, before and after the BPCI initiative.

Summary and Literature Gap
Numerous studies of the early BPCI initiative have shown the effectiveness and
efficiency of bundled payments for MJRL. The BPCI initiative was associated with decreases in
LOS, mortality, discharging patients to SNF, and Medicare payments without changes in quality
of care at BPCI-participating hospitals compared with non-participating hospitals (Carroll,
Chernew, Fendrick, Thompson, & Rose, 2018; Dummit et al., 2016; Dummit et al., 2018;
Dundon et al., 2016; Froemke et al., 2015; Iorio et al., 2016; Kivlahan et al., 2016; J. M. Zhu,
Patel, Shea, Neuman, & Werner, 2018). However, a few studies on sepsis reported no significant
effects of the BPCI initiative on hospital performance (CMS Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018; Joynt
Maddox et al., 2018).
My study will contribute to four aspects of the literature. First, it will contribute to
literature that examines the effects of the BPCI initiative using a short baseline and intervention
period. For example, most of studies for MJRL were based on CMS Medicare claims data using
a short baseline period (2 to 36 months) and intervention (3 to 20 months) (Dummit et al., 2018;
Edwards et al., 2017; Froemke et al., 2015). For sepsis, Joynt Maddox and et al. (2018) used a 6month baseline period and a 9-month intervention period (Joynt Maddox et al., 2018). To the
best of my knowledge, my study is the first to address effects of the BPCI initiative on hospital
performance for MJRL and sepsis based on a longer pre-intervention period (27 months) and
post-interventions period (27 to 30 months) using the most current data.
Second, this study will contribute to literature that uses DiD analyses to determine effects
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of the BPCI initiative. For example, the Lewin Group report used DiD analyses, but there were
large differences in baseline periods of the outcome between BPCI and matched comparison
group (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation
& Monitoring Annual Report, 2018). Therefore, results could have been biased. A study by Joynt
Maddox and et al. (2018) showed parallel baseline trends, yet they used a relatively short
baseline period. To address the validity of DiD, my study will test the significance of differences
in the average trend in outcomes in the treatment and comparison groups over the period of time
leading up to the BPCI initiative (McCoy, McDonough, & Rochowdhury, 2017).
Third, this study will contribute to literature that examines factors that determine quality
of care. For example, most studies on the BPCI initiative use mortality, ED use, and hospital
readmission as quality measures (Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Froemke et al., 2015;
Joynt Maddox et al., 2018). To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to use Patient
Safety Indicators (PSIs) to determine complications following procedures.
Fourth, this study will contribute to literature that examines effects of the BPCI initiative
for sepsis, since only a limited number of studies are available. For example, Joynt Maddox et al.
(2018) and a report from the Lewin Group (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018) are the only two
empirical studies on the BPCI initiative for sepsis.
Therefore, my project will help fill literature and research gaps by comparing effects of
the BPCI initiative for MJRL and sepsis on hospital performance based on state inpatient
discharge data with longer baselines and intervention periods. The purpose of this study,
therefore, is to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the BPCI initiative on hospital
performances for MJRL and sepsis in Nevada.

28

Chapter 3
Conceptual Framework

The rationale for this study and the associated literature review are based on a theoretical
agency framework. My goal is to understand how incentives of the BPCI initiative influence
hospital effectiveness and efficiency of care. I also address historical development and constructs.

Agency Theory
An open-system view of organizational structure was expanded by the relational concept
of organizations as a nexus of contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Scott, 2003). Agency theory
describes the relationship between a principal and an agent; the principal delegates work to the
agent and the agent performs that work (Figure 3) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 1975;
Ross, 1973). In the 1960s, economists identified a problem among cooperating parties with
different attitudes towards sharing risk. As early as 1973, scholars included risk sharing as an
agency problem within the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Eisenhardt
(1988, 1989) addressed the agency problem and the problem of risk sharing as part of agency
relationships. An agency problem occurs when the goals of the principal conflict with those of
the agent, and when the principal doesn’t have enough information about the agent’s work. The
goal of agency theory, therefore, is to develop the most effective contract between the principal
and their agent.
Agency theory has been applied to different fields of research including economics,
finance, accounting, political science, organizational behavior, and sociology. Some have
criticized it as not clearly addressing the problem of organization (Jensen, 1983; Perrow, 1986),
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but Jensen (1983) considered agency theory as “the foundation for a powerful theory of
organizations.” In the controversy over agency theory, Eisenhardt (1989) discovered two
contributions of the theory to organizational perspective. First, by treating information as a
commodity in agency theory, organizations are able to invest in information systems and
constrain the agent’s self-interest. The implication of risk is the second contribution of agency
theory. Outcome uncertainty is perceived as a risk-award trade-off, rather than just a risk.
Therefore, contracts between principals and agents are affected by a willingness between
principals and agents to take risks.
The agency structure is valid in diverse settings, including macro- to micro-level dyad
phenomena. Agency theory has been applied to various aspects of organizations including
compensation and incentives (Sappington, 1991), ownership and board relations, and when and
how to diversify, among other factors. The application of agency structure to the healthcare
system is a diverse, complex principal-agent relationship (Figure 4) (Casalino, 2001). For
example, a medical group acts as an agent of a health plan, and simultaneously as a principal to a
physician and a patient. According to Eisenhardt (1989):

Overall, the domain of agency theory is relationships that mirror the basic agency
structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behavior, but have
differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk (p59).

There are two lines of agency theory: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983). Using
the positivist agency theory, potential conflicting goals between the principal and their agent are
identified, and then ways to reduce the agent’s self-interest are proposed. It is especially effective
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if the principal is able to monitor the agent’s performance. It has been suggested that an agent is
more apt to act in the interest of the principal if the contract is based on outcomes (Eisenhardt,
1998). Conversely, the principal-agent theory is behavior-based. It seeks to forge the contract
that best satisfies both the principal and the agent and this occurs when the principal can
determine the agent’s actions by measuring the outcomes (Demski, 1978). This is especially
valid if a moral hazard and lack of information about the outcome are added. Eisenhardt (1989)
developed eight propositions based on the principal-agent theory to determine the most effective
contract between behavior (e.g., salaries) and outcome-based (e.g., commissions) contracts
(Figure 5).
The outcomes of contracts often depend on uncontrolled variables, such as policies,
competitor actions, and the economic climate, in addition to an agent’s behavior. When the
uncertainty of an outcome is high, the costs of shifting risk to the agent are high and behaviorbased contracts are more attractive than outcome-based contracts. A conflict of goals between
principal and agent can exist in outcome-based contracts. If a conflict exists, the agent is not
likely to behave as the principal desires and monitoring the agent will be necessary for
establishing outcome-based contracts.
Agency problems in the healthcare setting also occur. Dranove and White (1987)
illustrated the agency relationship between patients, physicians, and hospitals from the agency
perspective in a metaphor of FFS and Health Maintenance Organizations. Behavior within the
FFS system that led to the creation of alternate payment models was explained by the asymmetry
of information between the physician and patient. Under the FFS system, physicians tend to
overuse medical services as they have more information about illnesses and courses of treatment
than patients do. As a result, increased cost pressures on FFS insurers led to different types of

31

contracts, such as Health Maintenance Organizations, that share risks with their providers.
Casalino (2001) discussed the agency relationship in healthcare relative to uncertainty.
For example, uncertainty of the patients’ ability to pay for health care was reduced with creation
of the public health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid. At the same time, however,
uncertainty of the physicians’ quality and cost of care increased. Casalino viewed FFS and
managed care through a lens of uncertainty as, “patient uncertainty about the ability to afford
care; patient, purchaser, and payer uncertainty about the quality of care; and purchaser and payer
uncertainty about the cost of care” (Casalino, 2001).
Principal-agent theory has been used to examine behavior of health care organizations in
previous studies. DeBrock and Arnould (1992) discussed capitation as a risk-sharing
arrangement in the physician-insurer relationship to alleviate moral hazard (Debrock & Arnould,
1992). The physician was considered a double agent for the hospital and the patient in the study
by Ellis and McGuire (1986). An empirical study by Schneider and Mathios (2006) evaluated
physician behavior under different payment systems using a principal-agent framework.

In summary, agency theory serves as a foundation and justification for analyzing hospital
performance in the BPCI initiative. The agency theory defines the goal and focus of my study. It
provides a conceptual and theoretical framework for understanding the relationships among the
constructs of the model, measured by variables used in the study. The agency theory also
provides a context for interpreting the study results.

Organizational Effectiveness
The effectiveness of an organization is determined by its organizational structure (Scott,
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2003). Different criteria for effectiveness also determine the success of an organization. From
the open-system perspective, profitability, adaptability, and flexibility are important criteria
because organizations and their environments are highly interdependent in an open system.
Weick (1977) said one of the characteristics of effective organizations was, “structural units that
are loosely articulated so as to maximize sensitivity to the environment and diversity of response.”
The level of analysis is another important source of variation among effectiveness criteria.
Researchers have described the predictable behavior of organizations by using different
developmental stages. Lyden (1975) suggested that organizations emphasized different
functional problems at different organizational stages of developmental. Initially, organizations
focused on adaptation to the external environment, followed by resource acquisition and the
development of workflow procedures. The emphasis of organizations then changed to goal
attainment, efficient outcomes, and in the last stage moved to maintenance and
institutionalization of the structure.
Quinn and Cameron (1983) developed a lifecycle-effectiveness model where different
criteria of effectiveness were needed to determine the different stages of the organizational
lifecycle. Based on the Quinn and Rohrbaugh model (1983), Quinn and Cameron determined
that criteria from various models were of greater importance when used to evaluate the
effectiveness of organizational development at various stages. The open-systems criteria of
effectiveness, for example, are more important in the entrepreneurial stage, where flexibility,
readiness, and resource acquisition are critical. In the formalization and control stages of
organization, the rational goal model is more appropriate as it includes goal accomplishment,
productivity, and efficiency.
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Conceptual Framework of the Study
Agency theory, one of the main theories for organizational behavior, explains the
probable effects of an outcome-based contract on hospital performance (Figure 1). I based this
study on the positivist and principal-agent theories to postulates a strong conceptual and
theoretical framework for understanding the associations between the study variables: the
association between the BPCI initiative and hospital performance. This study uses the metaphor
of the BPCI initiative to illustrate the relationship between CMS and a hospital (Keeley, 1980).
The principal in this study is CMS, delegating work to an agent (hospital) under a new outcomebased contract (the BPCI initiative) to govern their relationship. Since participation in this
initiative is voluntarily and hospitals need to apply to participate, the BPCI initiative is
considered as a contract between the hospital and CMS rather than a regulation. Based on
positivist agency theory, I describe the effectiveness of the BPCI initiative as a governance
mechanism to control the self-interest behavior of the hospital. One of the main problems in
accelerated healthcare costs are the conflicting goals between providers (agents) and payers
(principals). A hospital has an incentive to overuse services while the goal of CMS is to reduce
the cost of care and increase its quality—value-based care. To limit overuse by the hospital while
increasing quality of care, CMS initiated an episode-based payment called the BPCI initiative in
2011. The initiative included all related services for a single patient for a given diagnosis. Under
the BPCI initiative, the hospital is expected to offer financial inducements that lead to efficient,
effective results, and not to the number of services that can be performed.
Principal-agent theory explains the BPCI initiative as a solution to control a hospital’s
moral hazard behavior. For example, hospital use is so complex that CMS cannot detect what the
hospital is actually doing. The hospital may overuse its services against the interest of CMS.
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Under the BPCI initiative Model 2, CMS uses an information system that sets a target price for
each episode of care and for each participating hospital. The purpose is to encourage the hospital
to align its performance with the interests of the principal (CMS) and reduce moral hazard.
Since CMS can verify the hospital’s performance by comparing it to the target price calculated
by CMS, the hospital is motivated to restrain hospital use.
According to principal-agent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), it is important to note that the
BPCI initiative is an outcome-based, not a behavior-based contract. First, hospital uses are not
programmed tasks. Programmed tasks are behaviors that can be specifically defined (Eisenhardt,
1988, 1989). The hospital check-in desk is a highly programmed service that requires a small set
of well-defined behaviors, such as regularity and properly executing administrative work; the
outcome behavior is easy to evaluate. Conversely, hospital services for an episode of care are not
precisely defined. For example, different hospitals may have different implant costs and care
coordination programs for MJRL. Therefore, an outcome-based contract motivates hospitals to
behave in the interest of the CMS, though their actual behaviors are not clearly evaluated by
CMS. Second, the outcomes of hospital performance are measurable in terms of effectiveness
and efficiency. LOS, discharge location after an episode of care, in-hospital mortality,
complications, total charges, and average charge per hospital day are readily measured as
outcomes, so the outcome-based contracts of the BPCI initiative are more attractive. Third, as
CMS becomes more risk averse in healthcare cost, it becomes more attractive to pass risk to the
hospital through gainsharing and penalties contained in an outcome-based contract. For this
study, I adopted two propositions from Eisenhardt (1989) to examine the behavior of a hospital
in the context of the outcome-based contract of the BPCI initiative Model 2 (Figure 6):

35

Proposition 1. When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome
based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal.
Proposition 2. When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the
agent is more likely to behave in interests of the principal.
(Eisenhardt, 1989)

Summary of Predictions from the Theoretical Model
In summary, agency theory provides a conceptual framework of organizational behaviors
that enables us to study potential effects of the BPCI initiative on hospital performance. CMS
established the BPCI initiative to minimize conflicts of interests between CMS and hospitals by
aligning the hospital’s incentive with that of CMS: value-based care. To test effects of the
contract (the BPCI initiative) governing the relationship between principal (CMS) and agent
(hospital) in conflicting goals, my study measures the agent’s performance in terms of
effectiveness and efficiency in response to the outcome-based contract (Figure 7).
Further, my study evaluates if the agent behaves differently for surgical care versus nonsurgical medical care when responding to the same contract. Based on agency theory, four
hypotheses are formed to examine the hospital performance for surgical (MJRL) and medical
care (sepsis) under the BPCI initiative (Figure 8).

Hypothesis 1. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the effectiveness
of hospital performance than non-participating hospitals.
x

H1a. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the effectiveness of
surgical care than non-participating hospitals.
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x

H1b. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the effectiveness of
medical care than non-participating hospitals.

Hypothesis 2. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the efficiency of
hospital performance than non-participating hospitals.
x

H2a. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the efficiency of
surgical care than non-participating hospitals.

x

H2b. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the efficiency of
medical care than non-participating hospitals.
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Chapter 4
Methods

This chapter introduces the research design, followed by a discussion of the data and
sample being used in this study. Finally, the measurement of variables is described and the
analytical approaches used to test hypotheses are explained.

Research Design
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of the BPCI initiative on hospital
performance in Nevada. The study design enables me to investigate associations between the
independent and dependent variables.
This study was based on a quasi-experimental design. It was a pre- and post-study with
both non-randomized intervention and comparison groups. The intervention was the
implementation of the bundled payment approach. The intervention group included discharges
from hospitals that participated in Phase 2 of the BPCI initiative Model 2 for MJRL and sepsis
episodes of care. The comparison group included discharges from those hospitals that did not
participate in Phase 2 of the BPCI initiative Model 2. The unit of analysis was hospital discharge.
Hospitals that only participated in Phase I were included in a comparison group. Under the BPCI
initiative Model 2, eight awardees representing ten hospitals in phase I participated in the riskbearing phase of the initiative, Phase II. The analysis included eight hospitals present during both
pre- and post- intervention periods. From SIDN data files, this study identified nine acute care
hospitals that did not participate in the BPCI initiative in Nevada. This allowed the same cohort
to be followed over the course of the study.
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SIDN was used for several reasons: (a) it is the only Nevada state representative database
that contains discharge information, (b) it includes a diverse sample of participants, (c) it
provides a range of hospital care information such as diagnoses and procedures, and (d) it
consists of variables that can be used to measure efficiency and effectiveness of hospital use.

Data

State Inpatient Database of Nevada.
The SIDN was mainly used for this study. It includes inpatient discharge records from all
non-federal community hospitals in Nevada. For each hospital discharge, the SIDN contains
information such as one principal diagnosis, 25 secondary diagnoses, 15 procedures, admission
and discharge status, patient demographics characteristics, expected payment source, total
charges, and LOS. The SIDN data also contain some hospital-level variables. The SIDN are
calendar-year files based on discharge date. For this study, SIDN data were obtained from the
Center for Health Information Analysis for Nevada. All patient identifiers were removed from
the SIDN (HCUP, 2018).

Sample.
This study used 2013–2017 SIDN data. The 2017 data were the latest publicly available
at the time of the study. The unit of analysis was hospital discharge.

The BPCI initiative in Nevada.
In Nevada, 15 health care facilities participated in the BPCI initiatives Model 2 and
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Model 3 (CMS, 2017f). As of July 1, 2018, 11 acute care hospitals and one physician group
practice participated in Model 2, and three inpatient rehabilitation facilities and one hospitalist
participated in Model 3 (CMS, 2018a). There were no BPCI initiative Model 1 participants in
Nevada. For the BPCI initiative Model 2, all 10 acute care hospitals participated in Phase1 for
the MJRL and sepsis episodes of care in March 7, 2014 or June 20, 2014. Phase I ended
September 30, 2015. Two of 10 initiating acute care hospitals did not transit to Phase 2, which is
comparable to a CMS report that about 20% of hospitals that began the Phase 1 Model 2
withdrew completely from the BPCI initiative (CMS, 2018b). Seven BPCI initiative participants
began Phase 2 in the MJRL episode of care either on April 1 or October 1, 2015. For sepsis, four
acute care hospitals began Phase 2 either on April 1 or July 1, 2015. Phase 2 ended September 30,
2018. The episode of care included all related services during the care and 90 days following
hospital discharge. All the BPCI initiative Model 2 participants in Nevada negotiated the target
price at a two percent discount rate based on three years of Medicare claims data for the
participants (CMS, 2018a). Three participants used the three-day hospital waiver for Medicare
SNF coverage (CMS, 2017e).

BPCI initiative Model 2 participating hospitals.
This study obtained publicly available lists from CMS of hospitals participating in the
BPCI initiative. The lists included names of hospitals participating in the BPCI initiative Model
2, the episodes of care each hospital participated in, their start date, and the date they planned to
terminate participation in Phase 1 and Phase 2. From these lists, the study identified hospitals
enrolled in Model 2 by April 1, 2015 for the MJRL and sepsis episodes of care in Nevada (Table
2). Model 2-participating hospitals in Nevada included profit and nonprofit acute care hospitals.
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The primary interest of this study was in hospitals that agreed to participate in Phase 2 of
the BPCI initiative Model 2. Phase 2-participating hospitals entered into risk-bearing agreements
with CMS instead of terminating the BPCI initiative after the Phase 1 preparation phase. Model 2
included all related hospital (parts A) and physician (part B) payments, allowing for the broadest
definition of an episode of care (Tsai et al., 2015). For simplicity, this study referred to the
analytic sample of hospitals participating under Phase 2 of Model 2 simply as “the BPCI
initiative participants.”
This study selected conflicting definitions for the two phases. Phase 1, non-risk-bearing
hospitals that chose not to join Phase 2 were classified as non-participating hospitals. Phase 1and Phase 2-participating hospitals were classified as participating hospitals. Of these two main
groups in our analytic sample the participants included three nonprofit and five for-profit acute
care hospitals, and the nonparticipants included six for-profit, two nonprofit acute hospitals, and
one county hospital (Table 2). In my study, the BPCI initiative participating hospitals, BPCIparticipating hospitals, and participating hospitals were interchangeably used to indicate the
BPCI initiative Model 2 Participating Hospitals.

Comparison hospitals.
This study identified comparison hospitals from the publicly available lists of CMS and
SIDN data. All hospitals that received payments from CMS for MJRL (DRG 469 and 470) and
sepsis (DRG 870, 871, and 872) were selected, except BPCI-participating hospitals in Nevada.
This study included 10 comparison hospitals for MJRL and 13 hospitals for sepsis (Table 3).

Study period.
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The study period covered the 27 to 33 months before each hospital started the bundled
payment, with the intervention period beginning immediately after the start date (Table 2). The
post-intervention period ranged from 29 to 33 months depending on the Phase 2 BPCI initiative
Model 2 enrollment date. For MJRL, hospitals that started the Phase 2 BPCI initiative in April
2015 had a 33-month intervention period; those that started in October 2015 had a 27-month
intervention period. For sepsis, the BPCI initiative participating hospitals had a 33-month or 30month intervention period depending on whether the hospital started the Phase 2 BPCI initiative
in April 2015 or July 2015, respectively (Table 2). It should be noted that the pre- and postintervention period varied between MJRL and sepsis as well as across hospitals in the
intervention group. Table 2 describes details of the start and end dates for both MJRL and sepsis
episodes of care for each participating hospital.
First, this study excluded samples between different intervention periods across hospitals
for both MJRL and sepsis in order to limit the number of different pre- and post-intervention
periods. For MJRL, samples between April 1, 2015 and October 1, 2015 were excluded (Figure
8). October 1, 2015 was regarded as the intervention period for MJRL across hospitals in the
intervention and comparison groups. For sepsis, samples between April 1, 2015 and July 1, 2015
were removed (Figure 9). This study used July 1, 2015 as the intervention period for sepsis.
Second, different time intervals were examined for MJRL and sepsis. For sepsis, this
study examined the entire time period, from 33 months before to 30 months after the BPCI
initiative. For MJRL, a narrow interval (24 months before and after the BPCI initiative) around
the treatment was tested to show the significant effect of the treatment. Since the BPCI initiative
was not randomly assigned, minimizing the chances of other unobserved differences affecting
outcome variables by the narrowing interval would have shown the significance of a treatment
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effect.

Patient selection and sample size.
Discharges were identified for MJRL by the MS-DRG codes 469 and 470 and for sepsis
by the MS-DRG codes 870–872. Specifically, MJRL was defined as a set of diagnosis-related
group (DRG) codes with major complications or comorbidity (MCC) (DRG469) and MJRL
without MCC (DRG470) (Appendix A). Sepsis was defined as a set of DRG codes for
septicemia or severe sepsis with mechanical ventilation for 96+ hours (DRG 870), septicemia or
severe sepsis without mechanical ventilation for 96+ hours w/ MCC (DRG 871), and septicemia
or severe sepsis without mechanical ventilation for 96+ hours without MCC (DRG 872), as
identified by CMS (Appendix A).
Figure 9 illustrates steps of the sample selection process for this study. A total of 285,250
discharges were identified from SIDN as Medicare Beneficiaries from 2013 to 2017. Patients
were included in the data analysis if they were diagnosed with either MJRL or sepsis, according
to the MS-DRGs. A total of 10,006 episodes of MJRL and 18,360 episodes of sepsis were
identified and included in the data analysis. This study excluded patients who were treated
between the two different implementation dates. For example, some hospitals implemented the
BPCI initiative for MJRL on April 1, 2015 and some began on October 1, 2015. This left 8,870
discharges for MJRL and 17,356 discharges for sepsis episode of care. I further excluded outliers
of LOS (if LOS was longer than 60 days) and total charge/costs (if total charge/costs was $0)
from both MJRL and sepsis. A total of 13 and 89 discharges from MJRL and sepsis were
removed, respectively. The final study sample of 8,870 for MJRL and 17,356 for sepsis were
included in the data analysis. The unit of analysis was the discharge.
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Measurement of Variables
Variables were carefully selected according to the conceptual framework (Figure 1) and
scientific literature. There were three groups of variables: (a) dependent variables of
effectiveness, (b) dependent variables of efficiency, and (c) independent variables. Control
variables functioned as independent variables in the regression models, but were not specified in
the conceptual framework; no testable hypotheses were suggested for the control variables. Table
4 lists the definitions and type of variables used in this study.

Dependent variables: effectiveness measures.
According to Scott (2003), organizational structure determines the effectiveness of an
organization in terms of profitability, adaptability, and flexibility. In my study, discharge
locations, in-hospital mortality, and complications were selected to measure the effectiveness of
hospital performance responding to an outcome-based contract, the BPCI initiative, since
outcomes of these variables were highly associated with coordinated and collaborative hospital
care (CMS, 2018b; Dummit et al., 2016; Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Froemke et
al., 2015; Iorio et al., 2016).

Discharge location.
Discharge location was commonly considered in studying the effectiveness of hospital
performance, since discharge location was not an end point of hospital care, but rather a
transitional care that required an integration of care (CMS Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018;
Dundon et al., 2016; Figueroa, Zhou, & Jha, 2019; Froemke et al., 2015; Siddiqi et al., 2017;
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Waring et al., 2014). Transitional care has often been decided by a physician, without hospital
input. Home discharge has been encouraged not only to reduce health care cost, but also to
increase value of care. The National Inpatient State (NIS) database defines home discharge as a
routine disposition outcome since going home is a desirable end point of hospital care (Sharma,
Sonig, Ambekar, & Nanda, 2014; Sonig, Khan, Wadhwa, Thakur, & Nanda, 2012). It has been
found that discharge to a SNF for MJRL was associated with higher complications and higher
readmissions than home discharge, which generally reflects an undesirable outcome of care
(Iorio et al., 2016; McLawhorn & Buller, 2017). Enhancing patient empowerment started inhospital is an important factor for discharging patients to home, but it is only possible with
improved care coordination (Braet, Weltens, & Sermeus, 2016; Waring et al., 2014). Developing
a care-coordination program for MJRL has had a positive association with home discharge rather
than discharging patients to SNF (Dundon et al., 2016). Further, studies have shown that
including physicians in developing an effective clinical pathway is highly associated with home
discharges (Froemke et al., 2015; McLawhorn & Buller, 2017; Siddiqi et al., 2017).
Therefore, my study evaluated discharge location to measure the effectiveness of hospital
performance using the variable “home” since this discharge requires an effective organizational
structure to streamline value-based care. The variable was recoded as dichotomous, with a
discharge location to home coded “1” and a patient discharge to other locations coded zero.

In-hospital mortality.
In-hospital mortality is a validated outcome to measure effectiveness of hospital
performance. Jha et al. (2007) showed higher hospital performance was associated with lower
mortality (Jha, Orav, Li, & Epstein, 2007). For example, early diagnosis and immediate
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treatment are especially important in reducing hospital deaths for patients treated with sepsis.
However, even with the structure of mandated protocols, more rapid completion of a sepsis care
bundle and administration of antibiotics are highly associated with reducing in-hospital mortality
(Seymour et al., 2017). In order to deliver time-sensitive treatment such as a sepsis care bundle,
education of all stakeholders involved in sepsis treatment and an effective organizational
structure are required. Studies have shown a decrease in in-hospital mortality at the BPCI
initiative participating hospitals after a MJRL procedure (CMS, 2018b; Dummit et al., 2016;
Dundon et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2017; Froemke et al., 2015; Iorio et al., 2016; Joynt Maddox
et al., 2018). However, there has been a concern that lower mortality might be associated with
an increase in discharging high-risk patients; hospitals might be able to lower in-hospital
mortality by discharging high-risk patients to other facilities. This variable was recoded as
dichotomous, with in-hospital mortality coded as “1” if a patient died during hospitalization and
zero if the patient did not.

Complications .
Reducing complications is important in increasing the effectiveness of hospital care
(DesHarnais, McMahon, Wroblewski, & Hogan, 1990). However, categories of complication
vary depending on the type of care patients received and how each complication was linked to
each procedure (Romano, Chan, Schembri, & Rainwater, 2002). For example, some studies
measured postoperative complications identified by the Complication Screening Project, which
includes postoperative infection, urinary and renal infection, pulmonary embolism, and blood
transfusion to measure complication after an MJRL procedure (Froemke et al., 2015; Nichols &
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Vose, 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2017). The CMS uses heart attack, pneumonia, sepsis, and
mechanical complications to measure the complication rate for MJRL (Medicare.gov, 2018).
The CMS developed a set of indicators called Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) to provide
information about potential hospital complications following procedures (AHRQ, 2017d). To my
knowledge, few studies have used PSIs to determine complications. However, a recent CMS
bundled payment model rationalizes using PSIs to measure complication of care. The nextgeneration CMS bundled payment model following the BPCI initiative, BPCI-Advanced,
includes PSIs as mandatary outcome measurements. My study used PSI 03, PSI 08, and PSI 13.
PSI 03 is a pressure ulcer rating applied to both medical and surgical discharge and defined by a
specific MS-DRG (AHRQ, 2017a). MS-DRG 469 and 470 for MJRL and MS-DRG 870–872 for
sepsis were included. Pressure ulcers are caused by pressure over a bony prominence causing a
localized area of tissue damage. A major risk factor for developing pressure ulcers is reduced
mobility, leaving a patient in one position for a long period of time for example (Wake, 2010).
Therefore, the incidence of pressure ulcers is often considered one of many aspects of
patient care that involves nurses and physicians (Wake, 2010). There is a limitation to using PSI
03 to measure potential complications for sepsis. Earlier studies on sepsis have shown that the
most serious complication of a pressure ulcer is sepsis (Galpin, Chow, Bayer, & Guze, 1976;
Lyder, 2010). Therefore, in my study I identified a pressure ulcer not as a primary diagnosis, but
measured it as a complication variable for both MJRL and sepsis. PSI 08 is the incidence of
hospital falls with a resulting hip fracture as defined by specific MS-DRGs, including DRG 469
and 470 (AHRQ, 2017b). PSI 13 indicates a postoperative sepsis rate for surgical discharge
defined by specific MS-DRGs including MS-DRG 469 and 470 (AHRQ, 2017a, 2017c). PSI
total indicates the incidence of PSI 03, PSI 08, or PSI 13. All PSIs are defined by ICD-9-CM and
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ICD-10-CM diagnosis codes. For my study, incidence of pressure ulcer (PSI 03) was measured
for sepsis-related complications and the PSI total was used to measure complications in cases of
MJRL. Appendix D lists ICD-9-CM and ICD-10 codes for each PSI. Complication variables, PSI
03, PSI 08, or PSI 13 and PSI total were recorded as dichotomous, with a value of “1” if yes,
zero if otherwise.

Dependent variables: efficiency measures.
Efficiency is defined as the time and resource consumption required for patients to
recover. It is measured by the average length of stay, total patient charges per discharge, and
average patient charge per day.

Length of in-hospital stay.
The length of in-hospital stays is often used to measure efficiency of hospital care since a
shorter LOS is highly associated with reducing the hospital cost per discharge (Froemke et al.,
2015; Iorio et al., 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2017; Siddiqi et al., 2017). However, a shorter LOS
may result in other adverse effects. More patients could be directed to a SNF from early
discharge, which leads to an increase in cost of care. A reduction in discharging patients to a
SNF was found to be a large portion of cost reduction in the BPCI initiative (CMS, 2018b;
Dundon et al., 2016; Iorio et al., 2016). Since the Model 2 BPCI initiative includes all costs of
care including PAC, I assume LOS will be a valid efficiency indicator to measure the effect of
the BPCI initiative. The variable LOS is measured in days. This study excluded any patients with
a LOS longer than 60 days.
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Total charge per discharge.
Total cost has been used as a main indicator to measure efficiency of hospital
performance (Jha, Orav, Dobson, Book, & Epstein, 2009; Russo & Adler, 2015). Lower total
costs, with an assumption of the same quality of care, indicate hospitals are providing efficient
care. Most studies of the BPCI initiative have reported a reduction in total cost of Medicare
payments at BPCI initiative participating hospitals for MJRL using a standardized care pathway,
but not for sepsis (CMS Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5
Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018; Courtney et al., 2016; Dummit et al., 2016;
Edwards et al., 2017; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018). However, these studies used total claimed bills
(total charge) from insurance claim data as a proxy for cost instead of measuring cost directly
(Finkler, 1982; Shen et al., 2018; Stoller et al., 2016). The charge represents the amount billed to
the payer but does not reflect the actual cost for hospital services. Finkler (1982) argued that use
of charges as a proxy for economic cost may lead to unjustified conclusions about efficiency of
care (Finkler, 1982). Since use of charge as a proxy for cost has been viewed as inadequately
estimating the economic cost of care (Ashby, 1992; Finkler, 1982), my study measured total
charges from the SIDN database to evaluate efficiency of hospital performance. The hospital
total charge was adjusted to the annual hospital inflation rate (Martin, Hartman, Washington, &
Catlin, 2019), but was not converted to cost. Analysis of total charges is important since that is
the amount being claimed to Medicare (Finkler, 1982). The variable Total Charge is measured in
dollars. This study excludes patients with no charges.

Average charge per hospital day.
Average charge per day is a relevant measure of the efficiency of hospital performance
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since it’s a composite measure of two variables of efficiency measurement: LOS and total charge
(Butler, 1995). The average charge per day is determined by dividing total charge by LOS.
Therefore, average charge per day decreases when LOS increases with the same total charge, or
when total charge decreases with the same LOS. Reductions of both total charge and LOS are the
most desirable scenario for decreasing the average charge per hospital day. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first study to examine effects of the BPCI initiative on average charges per
day. Average charge is determined by dividing total charge by LOS for each discharge. The
variable Average Charge is measured in dollars.

Independent variables: the BPCI initiative.
A contract was measured by the implementation of the BPCI initiative. It is a binary
variable with the value of “1” if a given patient was treated after the BPCI initiative was
implemented and zero if the patient was not.

Control Variables.
Since this study was not an experimental design based on randomization, using control
variables was important to consider potential confounding factors in data analysis. Several
patient- and hospital-level variables frequently used in prior studies are included in the
multivariable analysis. First, patient and hospital characteristics before the BPCI initiative might
have been different than after the BPCI initiative. Second, even though the relevant patient and
hospital characteristics did not change, by including them the error of variance may be reduced,
leading to a smaller standard error (Wooldridge, 2015). The patient-level variables, or patient
characteristics, include age, sex, race/ethnicity, and comorbidities. Hospital-level variables or
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hospital characteristics include hospital size (measured by the number of beds) and hospital
ownership (i.e., for-profit private, non-for-profit, and public). Teaching hospital status was not
included in the data analysis as it is highly correlated with hospital ownership status. Hospital
rural/urban status was not included in the data analysis because there were no rural hospitals
participating in the BPCI initiative.

Patient characteristics.
The set of variables that represent patient characteristics included age, sex, race/ethnicity,
and comorbidities. These variables are important in adjusting patient mix when multivariable
analyses are performed.

Age.
Age is closely related to clinical process and outcome (DesHarnais et al., 1990; Figueroa
et al., 2019). The mean age of Medicare beneficiaries who underwent MJRL was 75 years
(Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). From a DiD analysis of 2011–2015 Medicare claims,
Navathe et al. (2018) showed a 0.23% reduction in patients over 85 years old in BPCIparticipating hospitals (Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). Patient-level independent variables
were derived from SIDN and included the following: 64 years old and younger, 65–74, 75–84,
and 85 and older.

Sex.
Sex is a commonly used variable that relates to health care outcomes, including hospital
care (DesHarnais et al., 1990; Figueroa et al., 2019). Among Medicare beneficiaries, women
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(64%) were more likely receive MJRL than men (Froemke et al., 2015; Navathe, Liao, Dykstra,
et al., 2018). However, fewer women received MJRL at BPCI-participating hospitals than nonparticipating hospitals. The patient-level independent variables, Male and Female, were derived
from the SIDN.

Race/ethnicity.
Racial/ethnic disparities exist in healthcare across a variety of clinical conditions and
procedures (DesHarnais et al., 1990; Figueroa et al., 2019). Navathe et al. (2018) observed that
95% of Medicare beneficiaries who had MJRLs were of nonblack race/ethnicity according to
2011–2015 Medicare claims (Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). Navathe et al. (2018) also
showed a small reduction of black patients (-0.14%) at BPCI-participating hospitals after BPCI
implementation. Patient-level independent variables were derived from SIDN and included the
following: Native American, Asian, Pacific Islander, Black, White, Hispanic, Others (unknown).

Comorbidities.
Risk adjustment taking into account patient sociodemographics and comorbidities is
crucial in outcome research. Comorbidities are often negatively related to outcome (DesHarnais
et al., 1990; Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). Navathe et al. (2018) found there was a small
reduction in most comorbidity for MJRL at BPCI-participating hospitals except for alcohol use,
depression, and psychoses (Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018). Tested comorbidities were:
high complexity (-0.15%), obesity (-0.12%), diabetes (-0.22%), diabetes with complications (0.13%), coronary artery disease (-0.21%), and congestive heart failure (-0.07%) (Navathe, Liao,
Dykstra, et al., 2018). Based on Quan et al. (2005), comorbidities were defined in ICD-9-CM
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and ICD-10 codes and patient-level independent variables were derived from SIDN, including
the following: diabetes, diabetes with complications, hypertension, congestive heart failures,
COPD, depression, and obesity (Quan et al., 2005). Appendix C lists ICD-9-CM and ICD-10
codes for each comorbidity.

Hospital characteristics.
The set of variables that indicate hospital characteristics includes hospital size and
ownership of the hospital. The variables were highly associated with participation in the BPCI
initiative Model 2. Since all hospitals included in this study were urban, a variable differentiating
rural hospitals was not included.

Hospital size.
Hospital size is commonly considered in studying hospital behavior and performance
(Liao et al., 2019; Tsai et al., 2015). With BPCI, studies have found that BPCI-participating
hospitals were generally larger than non-participating hospitals (Joynt Maddox et al., 2018; Tsai
et al., 2015). Tsai et al (2015) reported 35.5% of BPCI hospitals had more than 400 beds while
11.6% of non-BPCI hospitals had the same number of beds (Tsai et al., 2015). Dummit et al.
(2016), Navathe et al. (2018), and Joynt Maddox et al. (2018) supported the association between
BPCI-participating hospitals and hospital size. BPCI hospitals had a greater number of beds than
non-BPCI hospitals for both MJRL and medical conditions (mean number of beds, 324 vs 213,
respectively) (Joynt Maddox et al., 2018; Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018).
For this study, number of beds was derived from the American Hospital Association file.
Hospital-level independent variables were derived from SIDN and included the following: small
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(less than 100 beds), medium (between 100 and 300 beds), and large (more than 300 beds).

Ownership of the hospital.
Many studies have shown that hospital behavior and performance vary among hospitals
with different types of ownership (Liao et al., 2019; Tsai et al., 2015). Hospital ownership is
generally classified into three types: for-profit, nonprofit, and public. Studies have found
associations between the BPCI initiative participating hospitals and hospital ownership. BPCI
hospitals were more likely than non-BPCI hospitals to be nonprofit (Joynt Maddox et al., 2018;
Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018; Tsai et al., 2015). Based on April 2014 Medicare claims,
82.2% of BPCI hospitals and 58.1% of non-BPCI hospitals were nonprofit (Tsai et al., 2015).
Another study reported a 2.3% increase in patients who were treated in nonprofit hospitals after
BPCI (Dummit et al., 2016). Hospital-level independent variables were derived from SIDN and
included the following structural variables: profit, nonprofit, or county.

Analytical Approaches
The difference-in-differences (DiD) method was the core analytical approach used in this
study.

The Difference-in-differences method.
To evaluate the impact of policy implementation, pre-post policy and participantnonparticipant approaches are often used. Pre-post assessment compares changes of outcomes
from the same individuals or communities before and after policy implementation. Participantnonparticipant comparisons compare outcomes of participants in the policy to nonparticipants.
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However, there were important limitations to consider. First, developments not related to a
change in policy may be present. For example, if changes in a factor like patient outcomes were
in the process of improving before implementation of the new policy, a pre-post study may
wrongly conclude that the improvement was due in part to the new policy. Second, selection bias
may exist. The Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method addresses these limitations by using a
comparison group not exposed to the policy change but experiencing the same time trends
(Dimick & Ryan, 2014; Wooldridge, 2015)
The DiD method compares outcomes of pre-post policy implementation between
treatment and comparison groups to minimize the bias of unobserved factors that could affect
outcomes and that change with the treatment. Therefore, differences in outcomes pre- and postpolicy implementation in the group exposed to the policy (treatment group) and in the group not
exposed the policy (comparison group), are changes in outcomes related to the policy
implementation without the effect of unobserved time trends. If unobserved factors also affected
the comparison group, then double-differencing can remove the bias and isolate the treatment
effect. Therefore, policy effect is estimated by DiD.

The DiD estimator ( ߜ ) is:
௧௧௧ሻ

௧௧௧
െ ܻത
ߜ ൌ  ሺܻത௦௧

௦
௦
ሻ െ ሺܻത௦௧
െ ܻത
ሻ

Where,
x

δ represents effect of policy of the average outcome of Y,

x

ܻതshows average outcomes,

x

treatment represents a group exposed the policy,
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(1)

x

comparison represents a group did not exposed to the policy,

x

pre represents before policy implementation,

x

post represents after policy implementation.

The DiD estimate is equal to zero if there is no association between policy
implementation and subsequent outcomes (Figure 10A). If there is an association, the DiD
estimate will show an improvement in the treatment group (Figure 10B).
According to the PubMed database, more studies in health policy and medicine are using
the DiD method (Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015). These studies include: the impact of health
insurance expansions under the affordable care act (Zhu, Brawarsky, Lipsitz, Huskamp, & Haas,
2010), payment policy changes and financial incentives (Song et al., 2011), impact of the
American College of Surgeons National Surgical Quality Improvement Program on clinical
outcomes (Rajaram et al., 2014), implementation of an electronic health record (McCullough,
Christianson, & Leerapan, 2013), and the Massachusetts Health Reform on Joint Replacement
Use (Hanchate et al., 2015). A DiD study was also used to identify the impact of the BPCI
initiative implementation (CMS, 2018b; Dummit et al., 2016; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018;
Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018).
Regression models are used to test the significance of DiD estimates rather than simple
subtraction as they adjust for control variables (patient demographics or hospital characteristics)
that may differ among groups (Ryan et al., 2015; Wooldridge, 2015). In addition to standard
statistical assumptions, “common shocks” and “parallel trends” assumptions need to undergo
DiD analysis (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Mazurenko, Shen, Shan, & Greenway, 2018; Ryan et al.,
2015; Wooldridge, 2015). The common shock hypothesis assumes that the treatment and
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comparison groups will be similarly affected by events occurring before, during, or after
treatment. Parallel trends, however, assumes that pretreatment outcomes between the treatment
and comparison groups will be similar (Figure 10). This leads to the assumption that any
outcomes between the two groups that differ must be due to the new policy. Another important
assumption is that the composition of the two groups must remain stable (Ryan et al., 2015).

Econometric frameworks.
To evaluate the agent’s behavior or performance, this study applied “micro-level” DiD in
which data exist at a lower level nested within the treatment unit (e.g., individual-level variables)
within the agent (i.e., organization) (Ryan et al., 2015). For individual i in organization j at time t
with two groups (treatment and comparison group) and two time periods (pre- and post), baseline
DiD models of this study take the form:
ܻ௧ ൌ  ߚ  ߚଵ ܲݐݏ௧  ߚଶ ܶݐܽ݁ݎ  ߚଷ ሺܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൈ ܲݐݏ௧ ሻ  ܺ௧  ߝ௧

(2)

Where,
x

ܻ௧ represents an outcome variable for a dependent variable for individual © of
organization j in time t,

x

ܲݐݏ௧ is a dummy variable for whether an individual occurred in the post-BPCI
period,

x

ܶݐܽ݁ݎ is a dummy variable indicating the value of one if an individual is getting
treated in the BPCI-hospitals, zero otherwise,

x

ߚଷ represents impact of the BPCI initiative on changes in outcomes,

x

ܺ௧ is a vector of control variables for sex, race, age, and comorbidity,
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x

ߝ௧ is the idiosyncratic error term.

This study has multiple treatment and comparison hospitals in the treatment and
comparison groups. Therefore, estimated differences in the treatment (or comparison) group
before and after the BPCI initiative could be due to a single hospital with substantially more
observations if all the treated or control hospitals were viewed as one hospital (2). In order to
estimate before and after changes “within” hospitals and then determine an average, this study
replaces the variable “Treat” with a complete set of dummy variables for each hospital (e.g.,
hospital fixed effects) (3).
ܻ௧ ൌ  ߚ  ߚଵ ܲݐݏ௧  ߚଷ ሺܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൈ ܲݐݏ௧ ሻ  ܺ௧ ߤ  ߝ௧ ,

(3)

where ߤ is a vector of organization fixed effects. Likewise, it is common to allow a more
flexible fitment of the variable “post” by replacing it with a complete set of time-fixed effects (4).
Therefore, the main framework was a DiD specification:
ܻ௧ ൌ  ߚ ߚଷ ሺܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൈ ܲݐݏ௧ ሻ  ܺ௧  ߤ  ܶ௧  ߝ௧ ,

(4)

where the outcome variable was one of the following variables: Homeift, a dummy
variable that equals “1” if the patient is discharged to home, or zero if otherwise; HHSijt, a
dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient is discharged to home under home health services,
or zero if otherwise; SNFijt is a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient is discharged to
skilled nursing facility, or zero if otherwise; mortalityijt is a dummy variable that equals “1” if the
patient is deceased in the hospital, or zero if otherwise; LOSijt is a continuous variable of the
number of days the patient stays in the hospital after the episode of care; PSI03ijt is a dummy
variable that equals “1” if the patient has a pressure ulcer after the episode of care, or zero if
otherwise; PSI08ijt is a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient has an in-hospital fall with
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hip fracture after the episode of care, or zero if otherwise; PSItotalijt is a dummy variable that
equals “1” if the patient has either a pressure ulcer or in hospital fall with hip fracture after the
episode of care, or zero if otherwise; TotalChargeijt is a continuous variable that measures the
average total charge for the patient; AverageChargeijt is a continuous variable that measures the
average charge per hospital day for the patient.
Here, ܶݐܽ݁ݎ was an indicator variable set equal to “1” for any individual in our sample
treated in the BPCI initiative participating hospital, and zero if otherwise. ܲݐݏ௧ was an
indicator variable set equal to “1” for any individual in our sample that was treated after the
implementation of the BPCI initiative. Further, ߤ was a set of hospital fixed effects and ܶ௧ was a
complete set of month-year fixed effects. And then, ܺ௧ was a set of demographic controls that
included the following characteristics: age categories (less than 65 years old, 75–84, 85 and older,
and 65–74 were omitted); a binary variable indicating if the patient was male; and a set of
categorical variables indicating the patient’s race/ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, Asian, and others;
White was the omitted category); a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed
with diabetes without complications; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was
diagnosed with diabetes with complications; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was
diagnosed with hypertension; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed with
congestive heart failure; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed with
COPD; a dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed with depression; and a
dummy variable that equals “1” if the patient was diagnosed with obesity. This study used the
OLS model for the impact on home, mortality, LOS, PSI 03, PSI 08, PSI 13, PSI total, total
charge, and average charge.
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The parameter ߚଷ , which is the parameter of interest, is the coefficient estimate of the
treatment group post the BPCI initiative interaction term. It estimates the effect of the BPCI
initiative on the average outcome of ܻ௧ . The term ߚଷ is estimated by computing the differences
in average among the treatment (5-7) and comparison groups (8-10) in each time period, and
then differences in the results over time (11,12).
(4)

ܻ௧ ൌ  ߚ ߚଷ ሺܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൈ ܲݐݏ௧ ሻ  ܺ௧  ߤ  ܶ௧  ߝ௧
Changes in Treatment Group
= ܧ൫ܻ௧ หܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൌ ͳǡ ܲݐݏ௧ ൌ ͳ൯ െ ܧሺ൫ܻ௧ หܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൌ ͳǡ ܲݐݏ௧ ൌ Ͳ൯

(5)

= ሺߚ  ߚଷ ሻ െ ሺߚ ሻ

(6)

ൌ ߚଷ

(7)

Changes in Comparison Group
= ܧ൫ܻ௧ หܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൌ Ͳǡ ܲݐݏ௧ ൌ ͳ൯ െ ܧሺ൫ܻ௧ หܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൌ Ͳǡ ܲݐݏ௧ ൌ Ͳ൯

(8)

=

(9)

ߚ െ ߚ

= 0

(10

Therefore, DiD estimates = (7) – (10)
(11)

= ߚଷ െ Ͳ

(12)

ൌ ߚଷ 

This study will make several estimated variations of the pre-BPCI initiative to check for
robustness (Navathe, Liao, Dykstra, et al., 2018): a generalized linear regression including
patient demographics (age, race, sex, comorbidities) and hospital characteristics (ownership,
hospital size) as controls, and time and hospital as fixed effects.
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Difference-in-differences assumptions.
Based on the DiD checklist proposed by Ryan et al. (2015) in Table 4, three assumptions
were tested. First, this study used data on the outcomes from both treatment and comparison
groups before and after the interventions were implemented. Second, pre-trends in outcomes
between treatment and comparison groups were tested. Since the BPCI initiative was not
randomly assigned, this study could not explicitly test parallel trends between BPCI-hospitals
and non-BPCI hospitals prior to intervention. This study, however, could test if the trends in
outcomes leading up to the BPCI initiative statistically differed between the treatment and the
comparison groups (McCoy et al., 2017). This study confined its attention to individual samples
before the BPCI initiative and constructed Months Since BPCIijt to represent the number of
months from each patient i treated date to BPCI implementation date. This study estimated
variants of:
ܻ௧ ൌ  ߙ  ߙଵ ܶݐܽ݁ݎ   ߙଶ ή ܫܥܲܤ݁ܿ݊݅ܵݏ݄ݐ݊ܯ௧
ߙଷ ή ܶݐܽ݁ݎ ή ܫܥܲܤ݁ܿ݊݅ܵݏ݄ݐ݊ܯ௧
ܺ௧  ߤ  ܶ௧  ߝ௧ ǡ
The coefficient of interest for the pre-trend test was derived from:
Changes in Treatment Group: ܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൌ ͳ
ȟݕ
ȁ
ൌ  ߙଶ   ߙ ଷ
ȟܫܥܲܤ݁ܿ݊݅ܵݏ݄ݐ݊ܯ௧ ்ୀଵ

Changes in Comparison Group: ܶݐܽ݁ݎ ൌ Ͳ
ȟݕ
ȁ
ൌ  ߙଶ
ȟܫܥܲܤ݁ܿ݊݅ܵݏ݄ݐ݊ܯ௧ ்ୀ
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(13)

Therefore, differences in the average trend in outcomes between the treatment group and
comparison group over the period of time leading up to the BPCI initiative = (14) – (15)
= (ߙଶ   ߙଷ ሻ െ  ߙଶ
= ߙଷ

This coefficient of ߙଷ estimate should be statistically insignificant if the pre-trends assumption
holds. This study reports the significance of ߙଷ for each outcome. Third, composition of the
treatment and comparison groups was examined through observed covariates between them
before and after the intervention.

General operationalized conceptual framework of agency theory.
A goal of the BPCI initiative is to align stakeholders’ incentives by shifting the volume of
services towards a more coordinated and value-based care. According to agency theory, a
hospital (agent) is more likely to behave in the interest of the principal (CMS) in the context of a
BPCI initiative (outcome-based contract) that sets a target price for each episode of care. Further,
a hospital is more likely to behave under value-based care since CMS has the information to
measure hospital performance. To evaluate potential changes in how a hospital’s behavior
responds to the BPCI initiative, my study measured changes in the effectiveness and efficiency
of hospital performance by analyzing the following variables in patient level: home, mortality,
complications, LOS, total charge, and average charge (Figure 11).
Agency theory leads to six key predictions that can be tested with an empirical model
(Figure 11). First, patients of BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to be discharged to
home than patients of non-participating hospitals. Second, patients at BPCI-participating
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hospitals are more likely to have lower in-hospital mortality than patients at non-participating
hospitals. Third, patients at BPCI-participating hospitals are less likely to have complications
than patients at non-participating hospitals. Fourth, patients at BPCI-participating hospitals are
more likely to have a shorter LOS than patients at non-participating hospitals. Fifth, patients at
BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to have lower total charges/costs than patients at
non-participating hospitals. Fifth, patients at BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to have
lower total charges/costs than patients at non-participating hospitals. And finally, patients at
BPCI-participating hospitals are more likely to have lower average charges than patients at nonparticipating hospitals.

Difference-in-differences analyses for discrete variables.
To evaluate the behavior or performance of the agent with an outcome-based contract
from the principal, as shown in Figures 6 and 7, the conceptual framework was operationalized
and displayed in Figure 9. When an evaluation of the agent’s behavior focused on effectiveness,
measured by three dichotomous variables, the DiD model on discrete dependent variables was
performed to test the hypotheses of this investigation. According to Figure 10 and Equation (2),
the general empirical DiD regression model, each of the indicators had its own equation as listed
below. The detailed relationships among variables are displayed in Figure 12.

Agent (Effectiveness) = f (Contract with Principal, Control Variables)
Hospital (Discharge Location) = f1 (BPCI, Control Variables)
Hospital (In-hospital Mortality) = f2 (BPCI, Control Variables)
Hospital (Complication) = f3 (BPCI, Control Variables)
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Accordingly, the operationalized hypotheses are as follows:
•

H1a1a. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more
likely to be discharged to home than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1a1b. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more
likely to be discharged to HHS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1a1c. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative-participating hospitals were less likely
to be discharged to SNF than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1a2. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely
to die in hospital than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1a3. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely
to have complications than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1b1a. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely
to be discharged to home than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1b1b. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more
likely to be discharged to HHS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1b1c. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely
to be discharged to SNF than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1b2. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely to
die in hospital than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H1b3. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less likely to
have complications than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
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The DiD analysis on discrete variables was conducted using general regression, OLS, in
STATA, version 15.1.

Difference-in-differences analyses for continuous variables.
When the evaluation of the agent’s behavior focused on efficiency, as measured by two
continuous variables, the DiD model on continuous dependent variables was performed to test
the hypotheses of this investigation. According to Figure 12 and Equation (2), the general
empirical DiD regression model, each of the indicators had its own equation, as listed below. The
detailed relationships among variables were displayed in Figure 9.

Agent (Efficiency) = f (Contract with Principal, Control Variables)
Hospital (LOS) = f4 (BPCI, covariates)
Hospital (Total Charge/Cost) = f5 (BPCI, covariates)
Hospital (Average Charge) = f6 (BPCI, covariates)

Accordingly, the operationalized hypotheses are as follows; on average,
•

H2a4. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely
to have shorter LOS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H2a5. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely
to have lower total charges than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H2a6. Patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely
to have lower average charges than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
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•

H2b4. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely
to have shorter LOS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

•

H2b5. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely
to have lower total charges than their counterparts in non-participating hospital.

•

H2b6. Patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely
to have lower average charges than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.

The DiD analysis on continuous variables was conducted using general regression, OLS,
in STATA, version 15.1.

Summary
This chapter detailed the study design, data sources, variable measurements, and
analytical approaches used in this investigation. The SIDN is a relatively rich database for
studying patient care outcomes and hospital performance and includes all community hospitals in
Nevada. The SIDN data were logically cleaned and able to be used for secondary analysis.
MJRL and sepsis were good representatives of clinical procedures and conditions for studying
the potential effects of bundled payment. The DiD modeling was applied to test the study
hypotheses and answer the two research questions posed for the study.
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Chapter 5
Results

Characteristics of the Study Population
During the 2013–2017 study period, a total of 4,470 patients underwent MJRL at the
eight hospitals that participated in the BPCI initiative for the MJRL episode of care (Figure 9).
These participating hospitals (treatment) were compared with nine non-participating hospitals
(comparison) that treated 4,400 MJRL patients (Table 2). For sepsis, a total of 4,087 patients
were treated at the four hospitals that participated in the BPCI initiative for sepsis episode of care
(Figure 9). These participating hospitals were compared with 13 comparison hospitals that
treated 13,269 patients for sepsis during the study period. The characteristics of MJRL and sepsis
for the treatment and comparison groups, both before and after implementation of the BPCI
initiative, are shown in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.

Patient characteristics.
The characteristics of patients at BPCI initiative participating hospitals were similar to
the characteristics of patients seen at comparison hospitals for MJRL procedures (Table 6). A
large proportion of patients in the treatment and comparison groups were between ages 65–74
(55% and 45%, respectively) followed by the 75–84-year-old groups (28% and 31%,
respectively) (Table 5). Both treatment and comparison groups had a higher proportion of female
(61.6% vs 61.0%, respectively) and white patients (84.3% vs 80.9%, respectively). The
proportion of patients with individual comorbidities at the BPCI initiative participating and
comparison hospitals were similar. Both BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals had
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a higher proportion of hypertensive (66.6% vs 61.9%, respectively) and diabetic patients (18.4%
vs 17.8%, respectively).
For sepsis, patients’ characteristics at treatment and comparison hospitals were also
similar. A large proportion of patients in treatment and comparison hospitals were between65–74
years old (34.5% vs 33.9%, respectively) and 75–84 years old (29.9% vs 29.3%, respectively).
The BPCI initiative participating hospitals and comparison hospitals had about the same portion
of male and female patients (53.1% of males in treatment vs 49.8% of females in comparison,
respectively), and both groups had a higher proportion of white patients (66.8% for treatment vs
72.6% for comparison). In terms of individual comorbidities, comparison hospitals had a higher
proportion of patients with hypertension (35.9% vs 42.3%) and COPD (28.8% vs 30.9%),
respectively, than BPCI initiative participating hospitals.
Characteristics of patients in the pre- and post-BPCI initiative were similar for both
treatment and comparison groups for MJRL procedures and sepsis, except for the proportion of
patients with individual comorbidities for sepsis. Both treatment and comparison hospitals had a
higher proportion of diabetes with complications (25.2% vs 19.3%, respectively) and congestive
heart failure patients (24.3% vs 20.6%, respectively) after the BPCI initiative compared to before
the BPCI initiative period.

Hospital characteristics.
Since the BPCI initiative is a voluntary participation program, comparing hospital
characteristics between BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals is important. Both the
BPCI initiative participating and non-participating hospitals for MJRL were more likely to be
medium-size hospitals (89.4% of the treatment and 63.8% of the comparison hospitals with 100–
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300 beds). Compared with the comparison hospitals, those participating in the BPCI initiative for
MJRL were more likely to be non-profit (55.5% of the treatment vs 23.9% of the comparison)
and non-teaching hospitals (0.0% of the treatment vs 5.9% of the comparison). Results were
similar for sepsis, except both the BPCI initiative participating and non-participating hospitals
were more likely to be profit hospitals (64.6% vs 67.0%, respectively).
The composition of hospital characteristics of treatment and comparison groups did not
change over the course of the study for MJRL, except for changes of the BPCI initiative
participating hospitals in hospital ownership. After the BPCI initiative, more profit hospitals
among the BPCI initiative participating hospitals operated MJRL procedures compared to before
the-BPCI initiative period (44.6% of treatment during pre-BPCI and 78.7% of treatment during
post-BPCI). Results were similar for sepsis in that those hospital characteristics for the treatment
and comparison groups did not alter before or after the BPCI initiative.

Means and standard deviations for dependent variables.
Tables 8 and 9 describe the means and standard deviations for dependent variables in
treatment and comparison hospitals, pre- and post-BPCI initiative for MJRL and sepsis.

Pre-Trend Tests
Significances of outcomes from pre-trend tests for each dependent variable indicated the
validity of DiD analyses used in this study (Table 10). For MJRL, differences in the average
trend in outcomes of all dependent variables in the treatment group and comparison group over
the period of time (-24 to 24 months) leading up to the BPCI initiative were not statistically
significant at 10% except home discharge at 5%. Results were the same for sepsis from 33
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months before to 29 months after the BPCI initiative at 10% significance. Therefore, my study
used two different time periods to examine effects of the BPCI initiative on hospital performance
for MJRL and sepsis. For MJRL, 24 months before and after the BPCI initiative on October 1,
2015 were examined. For sepsis, 33 months before and 30 months after the BPCI initiative on
July 1, 2015 were examined.

Effectiveness of Hospital Behaviors and Performance

Discharge location.
Some changes were observed in discharging patients to home for sepsis at the BPCI
initiative participating hospitals compared to the comparison hospitals during the post-BPCI
versus pre-BPCI periods. DiD estimates of 0.042 (significant at 5%) indicated that patients in the
treatment group for sepsis experienced an additional 0.042 increase on average in the probability
of being discharged to home following the BPCI initiative, as compared to the patients in the
comparison group (Table 11). The average probability of home discharge in the treatment group
during the pre- period was 0.169 (Table 9) and the pre-policy probability was estimated to
increase by 0.042. Therefore, effects of the BPCI initiative led to an estimated 25% (i.e.,
0.042/0.169=0.249) increase in the probability of a home discharge for sepsis. More specifically,
patients younger than 64 years of age (0.06; 35.5% average increase) and patients with
hypertension (0.047; 27.8% average increase) were associated with a statistically significant
increase in home discharge (Table 11). Hispanic (coef. =0.074, P<.01) and Asian patients (coef.
=0.037, P<.05) were significantly associated with an increase in home discharge for sepsis.
However, my study did not find this level of home discharge for MJRL (p-value from pre-trend
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test = 0.059) (Table 10).
In short, the results of my study supported the hypothesis that patients with sepsis in the
BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely to be discharged to home than their
counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H1b1a). However, the study did not support the
assumption that patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more
likely to be discharged to home than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H1a1a).

In-hospital mortality.
There were no apparent differences in hospital deaths related to MJRL between patients
treated in BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals before and after the BPCI initiative
(Table 12). However, results were different for sepsis with a DID estimate of -0.053 (significant
at 1%). In the treatment group during the pre- period, the probability of in-hospital mortality was
0.248 (Table 8) and pre-policy probability was estimated to be reduced by -0.053 to 0.195 (i.e.,
0.248 – 0.053 = 0.195), which implied that the average mortality rate for patients treated at
BPCI-participating hospitals decreased by about 21.4% following the BPCI initiative relative to
the patients treated at non-participating hospitals. (i.e., (0.195 – 0.248)/0.248 = - 0.214 or simply
(-0.053 /0 .248 = - 0.214). Patients younger than 64 years old (-0.051 with a significance of 1%)
and with comorbidities (specifically diabetes with complications, hypertension, depression, and
obesity) were highly associated with a decrease in hospital death for sepsis.

Complications.
A decrease in occurrence of complications among patients with sepsis was observed
between the BPCI initiative participating hospitals and the non-participating hospitals. My study
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observed an average 0.036 decrease (5% significance) in the probability of pressure ulcers
among patients treated for sepsis at the BPCI-participating hospitals relative to patients treated at
non-participating hospitals for the same condition (Table 13). The average probability of
pressure ulcers in the treatment group in the pre- period was 0.173 (Table 9). Therefore, the BPI
initiative reflected a 20.8% (i.e., -0.036/0.173) decrease in the incidence of pressure ulcers
among patients treated for sepsis in the treatment group compared with the comparison group.
However, the results were different for MJRL in that no significant changes in complications
were observed. My results showed no significant changes in the incidence of pressure ulcers,
hospital falls, or postoperative sepsis among patients treated for sepsis at BPCI-participating
hospitals compared to patients in the comparison hospitals (Table 13).

Efficiency of Hospital Behaviors and Performance

Length of hospital stay.
Changes in LOS with the episode of care for sepsis were detected with DiD estimates of 0.5 (significant at 5%), which indicated that patients in the treatment group experienced an
average 0.5-day decrease in LOS following the BPCI initiative compared to their counterparts in
the comparison group (Table 14). Average LOS before the policy for the treatment group was
almost 8 days (7.91 days, on average) (Table 9) and the pre-BPCI initiative probability was
estimated to be reduced by -0.5, or just over 7 days (e.g., 7.91 - 0.5 = 7.41), representing an
estimated 6.75% reduction in LOS (e.g., (7.41–7.91)/7.91 = - 0.0675). Therefore, the BPCI
initiative led to a half-day decrease (6.8%) in LOS among patients treated for sepsis at BPCIparticipating hospitals compared to patients treated at non-participating hospitals. This study
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found no statistically significant results for sepsis among patients older than 85 years or patients
with diabetes, diabetes with complications, hypertension, congestive heart failures, COPD, or
obesity. The BPCI initiative led to a decrease in LOS of almost a full day (coef. = -0.708, P<0.01)
for patients older than 85 years. A decreased LOS was also present among patients with diabetes
by 4.4% (coef = -0.346, P<0.01) and hypertension by 9.6% (coef = -0.762, P<0.01). However,
patients with DWC, CHF, COPD, and obesity showed a probability for an increase in LOS by a
half-day.
The results, however, were different for MJRL. My study observed no significant
changes in LOS among patients who had MJRL procedures at BPCI-participating hospitals
relative to patients at comparison hospitals for the same procedure.

Total charge per hospital discharge.
The effects of the BPCI initiative on total charges were detected for sepsis but not for
MJRL. My study showed a $13,092.85 decrease (significant at 5%) in total charges, on average,
among patients treated for sepsis by the treatment group compared to the comparison group after
the BPCI implementation (Table 15). The average total charges in the treatment group in the preperiod was $142,782 (Table 9) and the pre-policy total charge was estimated to be reduced by
$13,092.85, to $129,690. Therefore, the BPCI initiative led to a $13,092.85, or 9.2% decrease in
total charges, on average, at the BPCI initiative participating hospitals relative to nonparticipating hospitals following the BPCI initiative. Effects of the BPCI initiative on a decrease
in total charges for sepsis were significantly associated with patient characteristics. First, this
study indicated a significant decrease in total charges for ages 75—84, and older than 85. There
was an average decrease of $8,351 (significant at 1%) and $23,114 (significant at 1%) in total

73

charges among patients 75—84, and older than 85, respectively. Second, patients in the
treatment group with diabetes and hypertension were significantly associated with an average
total charge reduction of 3.1% ($4,465 decrease, 5% significance) and 13% ($18,618 decrease, 1%
significance), respectively.
My study showed no significant changes in total charge, on average, for patients with
MJRL procedures at BPCI-participating hospitals compared with patients treated at nonparticipating hospitals.

Average charge per hospital day.
There were no statistically significant changes in average charges per hospital day among
patients treated for MJRL at the BPCI initiative participating hospitals compared with patients
treated at non-participating hospitals, in the pre- versus post-BPCI initiative periods (Table 16).
The results were the same for patients with sepsis.

Answers to Research Questions
The first research question asked was if the BPCI initiative would show positive effects
on the effectiveness of hospital performance for MJRL and sepsis. My study found that that the
BPCI initiative positively affected the effectiveness of hospital performance for sepsis but not for
MJRL. The likelihood of patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals being
discharged to home increased more than that of their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
Similar findings were found in regard to in-hospital mortality; the level of mortality was lower
among patients in the BPCI-participating hospitals than those in non-participating hospitals after
the BPCI implementation. Regarding complications, patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative
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participating hospitals were less likely to have pressure ulcers than patients in non-participating
hospitals. The results, however, were different for MJRL. Patients with MJRL procedures
showed no significant changes in mortality or complications at BPCI-participating hospitals
compared to non-participating hospitals.
The second research question asked was if the BPCI initiative would show positive
effects on the efficiency of hospital performance for MJRL and sepsis. This study revealed some
positive effects of the BPCI initiative on improving the efficiency of hospital performance for
sepsis but not for MJRL. Regarding sepsis, patients in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals
tended to have shorter LOS and lower total charges than their counterparts in non-participating
hospitals. In contrast, the BPCI initiative did not affect the efficiency of hospital performance in
the case of MJRL.

Summary
Results of the data analyses using the SIDN showed that the BPCI initiative was
associated with improving the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance for sepsis but
not for MJRL. My study showed an average 25% increase in the probability of a home discharge,
an average 21.4% decrease in likelihood of mortality, an average 12% decrease in likelihood of
complications, an average 6.8% decrease in LOS, and an average 9.2% reduction in total charge
for sepsis patients treated at the BPCI-participating hospitals compared to patients treated at nonparticipating hospitals due to the BPCI initiative (Table 17). The two research questions and five
of the six hypotheses tested for hospital performance on sepsis demonstrated marked changes,
supporting the BPCI initiative participating hospitals as more likely to improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of medical care than non-participating hospitals (Table 18). However, none of the
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six hypotheses tested for hospital performance on MJRL were significant in supporting that
BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of surgical care than non-participating hospitals. I found no differences in changes in
home discharge, mortality, complications, LOS, or total charges for MJRL patients at BPCIparticipating hospitals and non-participating hospitals. The results of this study were validated by
a pre-trend test (Table 10). A further discussion of the findings, comparison with other BPCIrelated studies, and directions for future research, policy implication, and the limitations of this
study are discussed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Discussion

Introduction
The high cost of healthcare in the United States presents one of its most formidable
challenges. A large body of research on reducing healthcare expenditure suggests a strong
relationship between the behavior of health care providers and reimbursement models. The
objective of this study was to examine the association between health care outcomes and a valuebased financial incentive reimbursement model, the BPCI initiative from CMS, regarding the
effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance. This study makes several contributions to
the literature. To our knowledge, this is the first study that addresses effects of the BPCI
initiative on hospital performance based on a relatively long pre- and post-intervention period
and relying on the most recently available data. Little is known about the potential effects of the
BPCI initiative on medical care. This study adds new empirical evidence to the existing literature
by examining the association between the BPCI initiative and outcomes of sepsis, which focused
on non-surgical medical care. Further, our study, for the first time, expands the measurement of
outcomes to clinical complications among the AHRQ’s Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) by
studying the bundled payment policy; we examined pressure ulcers, patient falls, and
postoperative sepsis. Next, this study adds to our knowledge of the bundled payment through the
BPCI initiative. It showed there were no significant changes between intervention and
comparison hospitals during the pre-intervention period (McCoy et al., 2017). An earlier report
on the BPCI initiative did not explicitly confirm this parallel in pre-intervention trends—a major
assumption of DiD analysis (Dimick & Ryan, 2014; Dummit et al., 2018). Finally, this study
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compared the effects of bundle payments on hospital performance between surgical and medical
care. The following sections discuss key findings, directions for future research, public policy
implications and interventions, and limitation of the study.

Key Findings

Effectiveness of hospital care under the BPCI initiative.
Findings from this study indicated that the BPCI initiative was associated with improving
the effectiveness of hospital performance for medical care, specifically non-surgical medical care
for sepsis, but not for surgical care for MJRL.

Discharge location.
Earlier studies on the BPCI initiative reported a shift of discharging location from SNFs
to home following MJRL procedures. Froemke et al. (2015) showed an increase in discharging
patients to SNFs from 10.5 to 18.3%, while home discharge increased from 54 to 63.7%
(Froemke et al., 2015). Iorio and et al. (2016) studied CMS claim data from one academic
hospital and found increased discharges to home following implementation of the BPCI initiative
(Iorio et al., 2016). Doran and Zabinski (2015) examined effects of the BPCI initiative on
Medicare and non-Medicare patients at a community hospital, and reported an increase in home
discharge among Medicare patients (Doran & Zabinski, 2015). Unlike earlier studies, however,
my study did not find positive changes in outcomes for home discharge. This may have been due
to implementation of another CMS outcome-based contract prior to the BPCI initiative. The
CMS announced the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) for three medical
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conditions (myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia) in 2010 and it was expanded to
include a surgical condition, MJRL in 2013 (Chhabra, Ibrahim, Thumma, Ryan, & Dimick,
2019). My study did not measure hospital readmissions due to limited data availability.
However, preventing hospital readmission was being enforced by HRRP in 2013, which was the
same year as the voluntary participation in the BPCI initiative began, and this may have
influenced the discharge of patients to home for MJRL. Ali et al. (2017) reported that the
comorbidities of individual patients were significantly associated with 30-day readmission after a
THA procedure (Ali, Loeffler, Aylin, & Bottle, 2017). Yao et al. (2017) identified risk factors of
unplanned readmission among patients discharged to home after MJRL. They found older
patients and patients with diabetes, chronic heart failure, hypertension, or pulmonary disease
were strong predictors for hospital readmission following the home discharge of MJRL patients.
My study showed patients older than 85 years (coef = -0.130, P<0.01) and with comorbidities at
BPCI-participating hospitals were associated with a reduction in patients discharged to home.
Note that readmission is included in Model 2 of the BPCI initiative. Therefore, I speculate that
BPCI-participating hospitals may have responded differently to the BPCI initiative in addition to
the earlier HRRP contract. Regardless of BPCI participation, both participating and nonparticipating hospitals may have changed their practices in response to HRRP. However, BPCIparticipating hospitals would have a double incentive to reduce readmission in response to
another contract—the BPCI initiative. Therefore, BPCI-participating hospitals were less likely to
discharge high-risk patients to home in response to the BPCI initiative and HRRP, particularly
for elderly patients and patients with comorbidities, thus preventing hospital readmission.
My study demonstrated that patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating hospitals
were more likely to be discharged to home than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals
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after the BPCI implementation. These results differed from some existing studies. Two empirical
studies on sepsis reported no effects of the BPCI initiative on discharges to home (CMS Bundled
Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual
Report, 2018; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018). However, one non-peer-reviewed report showed an
increase in home discharge after implementing a clinical pathway for sepsis treatment. This
report was supported by other studies on the implementation of sepsis care bundles and an
increase in discharging patients to home (Han et al., 2018). Sepsis care bundles are “a group of
best evidence based interventions which when instituted together, gives maximum outcome
benefits” (Khan & Divatia, 2010). To implement sepsis care bundles, engagement of all
stakeholders in the care of sepsis (e.g., physicians, nurses, laboratory operations, pharmacists)
and development of management strategies to ensure compliance, is necessary. Therefore, BPCIparticipating hospitals are more likely to improve their internal structure of care delivery to
increase home discharge in response to the BPCI initiative.

In-hospital mortality.
My study did not detect differences in changes in hospital mortality for MJRL between
the BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals before and after the BPCI initiative. This
was consistent with findings from other studies that used Medicare claims to examine the 90-day
post-procedure mortality (CMS, 2018b; Dummit et al., 2016). My result also fits the temporal
trend of in-hospital mortality. There has been a trend of declining in-hospital mortality after
MJRL procedure over the last few decades. Studies have identified that the decreasing trend of
MJRL mortality is associated with initiation of multi-disciplinary pre-operative assessment, as
well as improved surgical safety and post-operative care (Berstock, Beswick, Lenguerrand,
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Whitehouse, & Blom, 2014; Hunt et al., 2013). Therefore, the findings of my study do not
support the hypothesis that patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals are
less likely to die in hospital than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H1a2).
In contrast, the findings of my study supported that patients with sepsis in the BPCI
initiative participating hospitals were less likely to die in the hospital than their counterparts in
non-participating hospitals (H1b2). This finding differs from other existing studies that, based on
Medicare claims, reported no difference in changes in mortality of sepsis between BPCIparticipating hospitals and non-participating hospitals (CMS, 2018b; Joynt Maddox et al., 2018).
Earlier diagnosis and immediate treatment are imperative actions to reduce hospital death for
patients with sepsis. To enforce early diagnosis and rapid initiation of treatment for sepsis, CMS
implemented a new sepsis core measure, SEP-1, in 2015 and CMS now recommends sepsis
bundle compliance with an ongoing increase in mortality and costs of sepsis (Medicare, 2018).
Another study found a significant decrease in in-hospital mortality after implementation of the
SEP-1 measure (Ramsdell, Smith, & Kerkhove, 2017). I have no direct information about
whether or not BPCI-participating hospitals have implemented CMS sepsis bundle compliance.
From the findings of my study, however, I assume that BPCI-participating hospitals were more
likely to implement the scientifically proven CMS sepsis bundle compliance responding to BPCI
initiative than the non-participating hospitals.

Complications.
To the best of my knowledge, no study has examined the potential effects of the BPCI
initiative on changes in complications. Most existing studies focus on LOS and total cost
(Nichols & Vose, 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2017). My study, in the case of MJRL, did not detect
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differences in changes in the incidence of pressure ulcers, patient falls with hip fracture, or
postoperative sepsis between BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals. There is a
possible explanation. In 2008, CMS started a No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired conditions that
included hospital falls, pressure ulcers, and surgical-site infections. Fehlberg et al. (2017)
showed nurses were about twice as likely to perform fall-related interventions after the CMS NoPay policy (Fehlberg et al., 2017). On the other hand, rates of hospital-acquired pressure ulcers
remained unchanged following initiation of the No-Pay policy in 2008 (Meddings et al., 2015).
The CMS No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired conditions in 2008 may have already improved
these conditions at both BPCI-participating and non-participating hospitals before the BPCI
initiative started in 2015. In the context of agency theory, hospitals (agents) have already
improved their performance by decreasing hospital falls, pressure ulcers, and surgical-site
infections in response to other outcome-based contracts (e.g., No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired
conditions in 2008) before the BPCI initiative started in 2015. As a result, the BPCI initiative
could not further change the performance of BPCI-participating hospitals to reduce
complications compared to non-participating hospitals. Therefore, my findings do not support
the hypothesis that patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were less
likely to have complications than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H1a3).
Conversely, my study showed a greater decrease in incidents of pressure ulcers for
patients with sepsis in BPCI-participating hospitals compared to those in non-participating
hospitals. To my knowledge, this is the first study that detects a positive association between the
BPCI initiative and complications from sepsis. The presence of pressure ulcers is associated with
an increase in discharging patients to SNFs, mortality, LOS to 7 days, and costs (Bauer, Rock,
Nazzal, Jones, & Qu, 2016). Therefore, the agent (hospital) is more likely to develop a
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coordinated organizational structure to decrease the incidence of pressure ulcers and align with
the interest of the principal (CMS). This alignment is an effort to contain costs and improve the
overall quality of care in response to outcome-based contracts (the BPCI initiative), bundled
payments.

Efficiency of hospital care under the BPCI initiative.
Results of my study demonstrated that the BPCI initiative was associated with enhancing
hospital efficiency for medical care of sepsis, but did not enhance the effectiveness of surgical
care for MJRL.

Length of in-hospital stay.
There were no substantial differences in changes in LOS for MJRL between participating
and non-participating hospitals after BPCI implementation. These results were inconsistent with
findings from the BPCI initiative literature, which found a significant decrease in LOS. A recent
analysis of the National Inpatient Sample data showed a LOS reduction from 4.06 days in 2002
to 2.97 days in 2013 (Molloy et al., 2017). Another study showed an 18% reduction in average
LOS after standardizing a care pathway for MJRL in response to the BPCI initiative (Froemke et
al., 2015). This reduction was mainly due to improvements in pain management protocols,
implants, anesthesia procedures, and surgical techniques. Findings of my study may be explained
by proactive behaviors at non-participating hospitals. According to Chhabra (2019), “Proactive
behavior is a behavior of taking initiative in improving current circumstances rather than
passively adapting to present conditions” (Chhabra et al., 2019). MJRL is the most common
elective surgery in the U.S. and a best-fit episode of care for a bundled payment model; CMS’
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alternative payment model has mainly focused on MJRL. The ACE demonstration program in
2009, BPCI initiative in 2012, and Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model (CJR) in
2016 are different bundled payment models that CMS established in a process of developing the
most effective reimbursement model. Further, private insurance might be proactive and design its
reimbursement model based on the CMS bundle payments since the MJRL episode of care is at
the forefront of a value-based payment model. Therefore, hospitals that do not participate in the
BPCI initiative may still want to prepare for the bundled payment model because private payers
typically add new methodologies to their provider contracts. BPCI non-participating hospitals
might have proactively redesigned the care pathway for MJRL as BPCI-participating hospitals
have done. As a result, regardless of the BPCI initiative participation, all hospitals are more
likely to improve LOS for MJRL. The results of my study did not support the hypothesis that
patients with MJRL in the BPCI initiative participating hospitals were more likely to have
shorter LOS than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H2a4).
Regarding sepsis, LOS at BPCI-participating hospitals decreased compared to nonparticipating hospitals. My study supported the hypothesis that patients with sepsis in BPCI
initiative participating hospitals were more likely to have a shorter LOS than their counterparts in
non-participating hospitals (H2b4). There are several explanations for this finding. First, a
significant decrease in complications at the BPCI-participating hospitals in my study might have
contributed to a significant reduction in LOS. Second, the literature on sepsis shows that it is
possible to decrease LOS using evidence-based guidelines. For example, implementation of a
machine learning-based sepsis prediction algorithm decreased LOS by 9.55% and mortality by
60.24% and the same results were repeated with the SEP-1 measure (McCoy & Das, 2017;
Ramsdell et al., 2017). Therefore, the findings of my study may indicate that BPCI-participating
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hospital were more likely to implement evidence-based guidelines in response to the BPCI
initiative.
In the context of agency theory, the agent (hospital) is more likely to implement a
behavior that decreases LOS for sepsis to align with the goal of the principal (CMS), and to
control cost of care in response to an outcome-based contract (the BPCI initiative). Nonparticipating hospitals may have behaved differently, however, since they have no incentives to
decrease LOS. In fact, without effective contracts that could govern the relationship between
principal and agent, an agent (non-participating hospital) is more likely to increase LOS to
receive more payments. Therefore, conflicts of interest still exist between the principal (CMS)
and agent (hospitals) without an outcome-based contract, such as the BPCI initiative.

Total charge per hospital discharge.
The results of my study did not support that patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative
participating hospitals were more likely to have lower total charges than their counterparts in
non-participating hospitals (H2a5). Unlike my findings, earlier studies on the BPCI initiative
show significant reductions in total costs and Medicare payments for MJRL (CMS Bundled
Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual
Report, 2018; Froemke et al., 2015). The common focus of hospitals seeking to contain costs is a
reduction in LOS. With insignificant changes in LOS and complications at BPCI-participating
hospitals for MJRL, it is not surprising to see insignificant changes in total charge.
My study supported the hypothesis that patients with sepsis in the BPCI initiative
participating hospitals were likely to have lower total charges than their counterparts in nonparticipating hospitals (H2b5). To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to show effects
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of bundled payments on the efficiency of hospital care regarding sepsis. First, in this study a
significant reduction in total charge for sepsis was expected with significant reductions in LOS
and complications. Second, as mentioned earlier, adherence to sepsis bundled care is important
in decreasing sepsis-related costs. Therefore, my findings may indicate that the agent (hospital)
will more likely act to decrease total charges and align with the goal of the principal (CMS); they
will try to restrain the cost of care in response to the outcome-based contract (the BPCI initiative),
which passes financial risk to the hospital via gainsharing and penalties. Conversely, nonparticipating hospitals without an outcome-based contract may behave differently. These agents
(hospitals), according to the agency theory, are more likely to perform more treatments to receive
more payments. Since the principal (CMS) has asymmetrical information about the agent’s work,
the agent has more incentive to provide more treatments. Therefore, the agent may tend to
increase total charges in opposition to the interest of the principal, which encourages value-based
care.

Average charge per hospital day.
This study found no significant changes in average charges per hospital day for MJRL or
sepsis at BPCI initiative participating hospitals relative to non-participating hospitals. Even
though findings of this study did not support that patients with MJRL and sepsis in the BPCI
initiative participating hospitals were more likely to have lower average daily charges than their
counterparts in non-participating hospitals (H2a6, H2b6), the study provided a different
perspective on hospital performance under the BPCI initiative, especially for sepsis. As expected,
there were no changes in average daily charges for MJRL as there were no changes in LOS and
total charge between the treatment and comparison groups for this study, following the BPCI
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initiative (Table 17). For sepsis, however, I expected a decrease in average daily charges with the
reduction in LOS and total charge. No changes in average daily charges reflect that the intensity
of care has not changed. I suspect the reduced total charge might be due to mainly in a decrease
in LOS, but not by altering the concentration of care per patient’s stay. This explains how agents
(BPCI-participating hospitals) are more likely to perform value-based care in responding to the
contract (BPCI initiative) by decreasing total charge by reducing LOS while the intensity of care
remains the same.

Hospital Care under the BPCI Initiative based on Agency Theory
Figure 13 illustrates changes in hospital behavior in responding to the BPCI initiative for
MJRL and sepsis. My study indicated that hospitals performed differently in response to the
outcome-based contract, the BPCI initiative, for surgical and medical care. For sepsis, BPCIparticipating hospitals are more likely to improve their organizational structure, incorporating
evidence-based guidelines such as sepsis care bundles, in response to the BPCI initiative. By
increasing routine home discharges and decreasing the negative outcomes of in-hospital
mortality and complications, the incentives of BPCI-participating hospitals (agent) regarding
sepsis seemed to shift toward value-based care. Conversely, non-participating hospitals may
have behaved differently because they had no incentives to invest in improving organizational
structure. Therefore, the results of my study supported that an agent in an outcome-based
contract with a principal is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal by improving its
effectiveness in the medical care of sepsis.
The BPCI initiative also has effects on governing relationships between principal and
agent in terms of its efficiency in sepsis care. My study showed an agent was more capable of
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restrain total charges and reducing length of hospital stay under an outcome-based contract since
the agent had stronger incentives to do so under the outcome-based contract (the BPCI
initiative); the financial risk was passed on to the hospital through gainsharing and penalties.
Conversely, non-participating hospitals may feel less compelled to increase their efficiency
without an outcome-based contract. Therefore, the conflicting goals between principal (CMS)
and agent in non-participating hospitals still exist.
For MJRL, my study found no improvement in efficiency for participating hospitals
versus non-participating hospitals in responding to the BPCI initiative. This could be interpreted
in two ways. First, both participating and non-participating hospitals may have increased the
efficiency of their performance regardless of the BPCI initiative. Second, neither participating
nor non-participating hospitals were able to improve their efficiency, even under the BPCI
initiative. MJRL is an elective procedure with large variations in cost of care and a relatively
simple clinical pathway. For example, the cost of surgical implants has a wide price range
depending on a physician’s choice. Earlier studies on the BPCI initiative have shown that a
reduction in implant cost is one of the first objectives in lowering total charges for MJRL (Doran
& Zabinski, 2015; Navathe et al., 2017). Studies also have shown that physician-led
standardization of care reduced the cost of implants, prescriptions, and laboratories (Froemke et
al., 2015; Siddiqi et al., 2017). Since hospitals and physicians are both financially accountable
for inpatient care, it seems that participating hospitals would be more likely to focus on physician
engagement to coordinate and standardize a clinical pathway for MJRL. Nevertheless, my study
did not produce the anticipated findings. Therefore, I speculate that both participating and nonparticipating hospitals have improved their efficiency of care. There are three major healthcare
systems in Nevada. All three systems that include 10 hospitals participated in Phase 1
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(preparation stage) Model 2 of the BPCI initiative for MJRL care. While transitioning to Phase 2,
one hospital system terminated their participation, leaving seven participating hospitals moving
into Phase 2 of the BPCI initiative. Further, there are a limited number of orthopedic physicians
in Nevada and they often work in different healthcare systems. Considering all aspects of these
unique healthcare delivery systems and infrastructures in Nevada, I speculate that nonparticipating hospitals are also able to engage with physicians to streamline health care pathways
and improve outcomes.
My study did not support agency theory on the effectiveness of hospital care for MJRL
under the BPCI initiative since no significant differences in changes in home discharge, mortality,
or complications were evident between participating and non-participating hospitals. However,
agency theory explains the agents’ (both participating and non-participating hospitals) behavior
in responding to another outcome-based contract (CMS No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired
condition) in 2008. Therefore, a conflict of interest between CMS and its agents may have
started to resolve before the BPCI initiative was implemented in Nevada in 2015.

Summary of the Findings
Based on the agency theory, I examined the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital
performance for MJRL and care of sepsis in response to the outcome-based contract, the BPCI
initiative.
The findings of this study did not support the hypothesis that BPCI initiative participating
hospitals were more likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance
for surgical care (MJRL) than non-participating hospitals in response to the BPCI initiative (H1a
and H2a). Conversely, this study’s findings support that BPCI initiative participating hospitals
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were more likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their performance for medical
care (sepsis) than non-participating hospitals responding to the BPCI-initiative (H1b and H2b).
There are several explanations for this finding. First, baseline outcomes of the BPCIparticipating hospitals were much higher than comparison groups for sepsis. For example, mean
total charge in the treatment group was much higher ($142,782) than mean total charge in the
comparison group ($116,990) during the pre-BPCI initiative period for the care of sepsis (Table
9). Since target prices for the BPCI initiative are based on a hospital’s improvement over its own
past performance and are used to determine their gainsharing, hospitals with higher baseline
outcomes such as higher total charge have more room to improve their hospital performance.
This suggests there might be a potential participation bias that could have led to changes in the
different outcomes between treatment and comparison groups, before and after the BPCI
initiative. Second, proactive effects may explain insignificant changes in hospital performance
for MJRL. In addition to the BPCI initiative, CMS announced the CJR model in 2015. Unlike the
BPCI initiative, the CJR model created regional competition since the target price of the CJR
model was based on regional claims data and participating hospitals’ own data from previous
years (McLawhorn & Buller, 2017). Therefore, hospitals not participating in the BPCI initiative
still want to prepare for the bundled payment model to be compatible with their own region.
Third, findings on early bundled payments for MJRL from existing studies were highly positive.
Many studies reported a significant decrease in cost for MJRL by reconstructing the care
pathway. Therefore, hospitals that were not participating in the BPCI initiative may have
participated in developing a care pathway to improve effectiveness and efficiency of care. Table
18 summarizes the general results of my hypothesis testing.
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Directions for Future Research
The evaluation of alternative payment models on hospital care improvement is not
complete. My focus on the BPCI initiative suggested some positive effects of a financial,
outcome-based contract on hospital performance for MJRL and care of sepsis. There is one more
year of SIDN data to be evaluated (Phase II BPCI Model 2 ended in September 30, 2018).
However, additional data might not enable a much more in-depth analysis of the BPCI initiative
since there are limited baseline episode payments to reduce episode spending. Additional
research is needed to determine types of financial incentives and health care outcomes that will
motivate hospitals to better manage resources, coordinate care, and thus reduce total charges and
costs. Furthermore, different episodes of care may require different types of outcome
measurements in addition to financial incentives. For example, adherence to sepsis bundle
compliance is an essential element in reducing mortality and the cost of care for sepsis.
Therefore, including the SEP-1 measure should be one of the outcome measurements for sepsis
in future bundled payments.
A qualitative study merits inclusion in future research on bundled payments to examine
providers’ perceptions on the BPCI initiative. According to the resource dependence theory,
managerial and organizational decision-making become important when resources are limited, as
with a bundled payment. For example, physician engagement and care coordination are essential
elements for successful implementation of the BPCI initiative. Therefore, operational
perspectives on merits and barriers of the BPCI initiative implementation will be beneficial to
advance the designing of alternative reimbursement models. Operational perspectives from nonparticipating hospitals need to be conducted as well. Sampling of the qualitative study needs to
include chief executive officers, chief operating officers, chief financial officers, medical
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directors, and operational directors for each episode of care.
Patient-level information for each procedure is needed to further understand the effects of
bundled payments on hospital performance. First, current available data only allow researchers to
analyze effects of the BPCI initiative on total charges and costs and on total Medicare payments
without knowing the components of the total charges and costs. For example, total charges and
costs include those for radiology, laboratory services, ED and ICU use, cardio, respiratory
system, blood utilization, pharmacy, operating room, and more. Further, different episodes may
have different categories of total charges and costs. Therefore, an examination of electronic
health records needs to be conducted to understand the effects of bundled payments on a specific
category, whether the total cost is reduced or not. This may allow hospitals and the CMS to
develop different strategies for different episodes of care and target the cost of different
categories. Other aspects of in-hospital complications that need to be examined include transient
hypotension, urinary retention, and transfusion rate.
Since the BPCI initiative ended in September 2018, CMS has announced another bundled
payment model called BPCI-Advanced started on October 1, 2018. BPCI-Advanced is a
voluntary model with a few different approaches from the BPCI initiative. The BPCI-Advanced
is a more outcome-based model than the BPCI initiative since payment of BPCI-Advanced is
tied to performance on quality measures rather than just target price. BPCI-Advanced adopted
seven administrative, quality-measure fact sheets for each episode of care. The quality measures
for MJRL include: perioperative care; hospital-level, risk-standardized complication rates;
readmission measures; and PSIs. In addition, BPCI-Advanced provides preliminary target prices
to participating hospitals each year. Therefore, research will be needed to determine how BPCIAdvanced affects hospital performance with these more specific outcome-based contracts.
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Implications for Health Care Policy and Interventions
Many policy makers believe in strengthening financial and other incentives to
improve hospital performance (Peck, Usadi, Mainor, Fisher, & Colla, 2019). My findings
supported the observation that hospitals were more likely to act in the interest of the CMS when
their relationship was founded on an outcome-based contract with incentives (Figure 1).
Importantly, my findings for the bundled payment with sepsis showed the feasibility of a total
charge reduction without compromising the quality of medical care. Even though there is limited
research supporting my findings, the positive outcomes were a strong indicator for including
non-surgical care when developing an alternative payment model and mechanisms. CMS has
developed different bundled payment models as alternative payment methods to align itself with
the interests of providers as it moves away from FFS. As bundled payment models evolve, the
effect of the BPCI initiative shows we are moving closer to value-based care. However, more
improvements in these models are needed. So far, the CMS model has focused on the total cost
of care. Even quality of care was indirectly monitored by total cost, since any charges for
readmission and post-care services were all included in their bundle. However, there is a limit to
how much cost can be reduced after approaching a “floor.” Therefore, future developments in the
bundled payment model need to be based on more than a target price. The absence of direct
quality measurement is another limitation of the current model. It is evident that the same quality
measurement should not be applied to different episodes of care. For example, the quality of
measure for sepsis may include compliance with SEP-1, which has had an important role in
reducing mortality and readmissions. While effective for sepsis, this measure was not effective
for MJRL. Therefore, it may be time to expand the incentives in bundled payment plans, in
addition to the existing financial incentives based on episode-specific and evidence-based
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outcome measurements.
Savings in episode payments made to the Medicare program through the BPCI initiative
were lost in reconciliation payments to the participants (CMS Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement Initiative Models 2-4: Year 5 Evaluation & Monitoring Annual Report, 2018).
There is more room to improve savings to the CMS, however, especially for surgical care. The
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule is the payment system CMS uses for physician reimbursement
during inpatient stays. Accuracy of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule is important since
payments of Medicare’s FFS, and most commercial insurers, are based on this fee schedule,
including alternative payment models like bundled payments (Urwin et al., 2019). Physician time
is one indicator of a physician’s work in the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. This schedule
includes preparation time for the operation, operation time, and postoperative time of the hospital
and the physician’s office. A recent empirical study found that the Medical Physician Fee
Schedule significantly overestimates operating times for MJRL by 18–23 %, and that of
revisions by 48–61% (Urwin et al., 2019). The current Medicare Physician Fee Schedule is not
responsible for other related aspects of care, such as pre-op, post-op, and quality of care. Figure
14 illustrates that 88.36% of gainsharing distributions go to physicians. To reduce Medicare
payments, therefore, the bundled payment system should be modified based on an updated
Medical Physician Fee Schedule, and then enforced.

Assumptions and Limitations
This study had several limitations. First, findings may have limited generalizability since
the study sample was limited to hospitals in Nevada. Second, effects of the BPCI initiative might
not represent the effectiveness and efficiency of a value-based payment model accurately since
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its implementation was voluntary. For example, the BPCI initiative participating hospitals tended
to have higher baselines for their episode payments than non-participating hospitals. However,
pre-trend tests and the consistency of patient characteristics between the BPCI initiative
participating hospitals and comparison hospitals supported the validity of this study. Third,
selection of a comparison group might have been biased. Due to limited data availability, this
study did not select comparison hospitals using propensity scores based on hospital and market
characteristics and baseline outcome measurements (Dimick & Ryan, 2014; Joynt Maddox et al.,
2018). However, non-significance changes (p-value larger than 0.5) for all outcome
measurements between the treatment and comparison groups leading up to the BPCI initiative
supported the validly of this study (Table 10). Fourth, limited data resources also affected the
measure of quality care in this study. Post-discharge data such as hospital readmission, ED use,
and PAC were therefore not included. However, the recent bundled payment model by CMS,
BPCI-Advanced, supported analyses of PSI as a quality measurement. BPCI-Advanced includes
PSI 03, pressure ulcers, and PSI 08, hospital falls, in quality-measurement sheets for MJRL and
sepsis. Fifth, using pressure ulcers to measure complications of sepsis may raise questions about
the validity of measurement. Sixth, the SIDN database does not contain patient-level data, such
as smoking, that could influence outcomes of MJRL. In addition, procedural characteristics like
blood transfusion or operative time that may have influenced outcomes were not available in the
SIDN database. Finally, total charges were not translated into total costs. The analyses of total
charges were important, however, since these were the amount being claimed to Medicare.

Conclusions
To date, bundled payment models have primarily focused on surgical care, such as MJRL.
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This study provided results that suggest hospitals could achieve improved outcomes in the
medical care of sepsis in response to the BPCI initiative. The recognition that the BPCI initiative
was associated with improving the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital performance in the
case of sepsis, provides new opportunities for developing an outcome-based reimbursement
model that extends to other medical care episodes. The agency theory was a well-suited
conceptual framework, describing changes in hospital performance in response to an outcomebased contract, the BPCI initiative. In the context of agency theory, the BPCI initiative
participating hospitals were more likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of hospital
performance than non-participating hospitals because of this outcome-based contract, the BPCI
initiative. The empirical results of this study suggested that the BPCI initiative increased home
discharge, decreased complications, LOS, and total charges for medical care of sepsis,
specifically, but not for surgical care of MJRL.
The outcome-based reimbursement model was effective in improving hospital
performance, suggesting that public policies are needed to incentivize hospitals to be more
effective and efficient. Overall, the BPCI initiative appears to be a step towards reducing health
care expenditures for different episodes of care without compromising outcomes and quality of
care.
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Retrospective

All Part A services paid
as part of the MS-DRG
payment

Payment

Episode of Care
includes

Resource: CMS (2016)

All DRGs; all acute
patients

Model 1

Episode

Table 1. BPCI Initiative Models
Model 3
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All non-hospice Part A
and B services during
the initial inpatient stay,
post-acute period and
readmissions

Retrospective

All non-hospice Part A
and B services during
the post-acute period
and readmissions

Retrospective

Selected DRGs; hospital Selected DRGs; postplus post-acute period
acute period only

Model 2

All non-hospice Part A
and B services
(including the hospital
and physician) during
initial inpatient stay and
readmission

Prospective

Selected DRGs; hospital
plus readmissions

Model 4
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Major Joint Replacement of the Lower
Extremity (DRG 469, 470)
Phase 1
Phase 2
Hospital # 1
6/20/14-9/30/15
4/1/15-9/30/18
Hospital # 2
6/20/14-9/30/15
4/1/15-9/30/18
Hospital # 3
6/20/14-9/30/15
4/1/15-9/30/18
Hospital # 4
6/20/14-9/30/15
4/1/15-9/30/18
Hospital # 5
6/20/14-9/30/15
Hospital # 6 (nonprofit)
3/7/14-9/30/15
10/1/15-9/30/18
Hospital # 7 (nonprofit)
3/7/14-9/30/15
10/1/15-9/30/18
Hospital # 8 (nonprofit)
3/7/14-9/30/15
10/1/15-9/30/18
Hospital # 9
6/20/14-9/30/15
Hospital # 10
6/20/14-9/30/15
Hospital # 11
Hospital # 12 (county)
Hospital # 13
Hospital # 14
Hospital # 15
Hospital # 16 (nonprofit)
Hospital # 17 (nonprofit)
Note. (-) indicates non-participating hospitals.

Table 2. BPCI Initiative Model 2 in Nevada
Sepsis
(DRG 870, 871, 872)
Phase 1
Phase 2
6/20/14-9/30/15
6/20/14-9/30/15
6/20/14-9/30/15
7/1/15-9/30/18
6/20/14-9/30/15
7/1/15-9/30/18
6/20/14-9/30/15
7/1/15-9/30/18
3/7/14-9/30/15
4/1/15-9/30/18
3/7/14-9/30/15
3/7/14-9/30/15
6/20/14-9/30/15
6/20/14-9/30/15
Y
Y
Y

Three-Day
Hospital Waiver

Table 3. BPCI-Participating (Treatment) and Non-Participating Hospitals (Comparison)
BPCI-participating Hospitals
(Treatment)
MJRL

7 Hospitals

Sepsis

4 Hospitals

BPCI Implementation Date
4/1/15-9/30/18 (4 hospitals)
10/1/15-9/30/2015 (3 hospitals)
4/1/15-9/30/18 (1 hospitals)
7/1/15-9/30/2015 (3 hospitals)
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Non-participating Hospitals
(Comparison)
10 Hospitals
13 Hospitals

Table 4. List of Variables: Type, Definition, and Coding Value
Type
Definition
Dependent Variable

Coding Value

Discharge Location
Home

Binary

Discharged to home

1=yes; 0=no

Mortality

Binary

Died in hospital after procedure

1=yes; 0=no

Complication
PSI03
PSI08
PSItotal

Binary
Binary
Binary

Pressure Ulcer
In hospital fall with hip fracture
Pressure ulcer or in hospital fall
with hip fracture

1=yes; 0=no
1=yes; 0=no

LOS

Continuous

Length of hospital stay

Day

Total Charge

Continuous

Total charge

$

Average Charge
Continuous
Independent Variable

Charge per Day

$

BPCI

BPCI initiative

Binary

1= Post-BPCI
0= Pre-BPCI
Notes. PSI = patient safety indicator; PSI 03= pressure ulcer; PSI 08=in hospital fall with hip
fracture; PSI 13=postoperative sepsis; PSI Total = PSI 03 + PSI 08; LOS= length of in-hospital
stays
Resource. AHRQ (2017, 2018)
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Table 5. Elements of Difference-in-Differences Checklist
Confirm that
1. Data exist on study outcomes for
at least one observation period
among groups exposed and not
exposed to an intervention, both
before and after the intervention
was implemented

How to Test
Directly observable

2. Trends in outcome performance
prior to an intervention are
“parallel” between treatment and
comparison groups

Test equivalence of linear trends
between treatment and comparison
groups prior to intervention by testing
the significance of the interaction
term between the time trend and the
treatment group

Yes

3. Baseline outcome levels are
unrelated to expectations for
changes in outcomes

For both treatment and comparison
groups, test whether baseline outcome
is correlated with change in
performance across the study period

Not applicable

4. Violations of standard statistical
assumptions are appropriately
addressed

Test for violations of
homoscedasticity of standard errors

Not applicable

5. Events of factors other than
treatment, occurring at the time of
treatment, do not differentially
affect outcomes for treatment and
comparison groups

Not directly testable

Not applicable

6. The composition of treatment and
comparison groups does not
change over the course of the
study

Test for difference in observed
covariates between treatment and
comparison rates before and after the
intervention. Test for differential
drop-out rates between treatment and
comparison groups

7. Treatment does not “spill-over”
from treatment group to
comparison group

Test whether comparison group
experiences deviation from existing
trend concurrent with intervention

Source. Ryan (2015)
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Check
Yes

Yes

Not applicable

N
Patient Characteristics
Age
< 64
65–74
75–84
85 and older
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Others*
Comorbidities
Diabetes
Diabetes with complications
Hypertensions
Congestive Heart Failures
COPD
Depression
Obesity
Hospital Characteristics
Hospital Size
Small (<100 beds)
Medium (100–299 beds)
Large (> 300 beds)
Hospital Ownership
Profit
Non-profit
County
Teaching Hospital
8.76
55.07
28.47
7.70
38.36
61.64
84.32
5.97
4.38
2.37
2.97
18.37
1.62
66.62
0.81
7.77
13.00
0.00
0.00
89.40
10.60
44.58
55.48
0.00
0.00

248
1,559
806
218
1,086
1,745
2,387
169
124
67
84
520
46
1,886
23
220
368
0
0
2,531
300
1,262
1,575
0
0

Treatment
2,831
Frequency
Percent

Pre
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1,275
436
108
108

85
1,160
573

324
33
1,125
45
235
186
0

1,470
87
118
55
88

709
1,109

197
823
571
227

70.09
23.93
5.94
5.94

4.68
63.81
31.52

17.82
1.82
61.88
2.48
12.93
10.23
0.00

80.86
4.79
6.49
3.03
4.83

39.00
61.00

10.84
45.27
31.41
12.49

Comparison
1,818
Frequency
Percent

1,290
349
0
0

0
1,344
295

279
77
1,009
49
152
179
194

1,307
115
92
73
52

622
1,017

154
905
452
128

78.71
21.29
0.00
0.00

0.00
82.00
18.00

17.02
4.70
61.56
2.99
9.27
10.92
11.84

79.74
7.02
5.61
4.45
3.17

37.95
62.05

9.40
55.22
27.58
7.81

Treatment
1,639
Frequency
Percent

1,720
758
105
105

78
1,901
603

365
78
1,461
71
246
202
261

2,231
86
137
49
79

1,027
1,555

197
1,374
776
235

66.59
29.35
4.07
4.07

3.02
73.63
23.35

14.14
3.02
56.58
2.75
9.53
7.82
10.11

86.41
3.33
5.31
1.90
3.06

39.78
60.22

7.63
53.21
30.05
9.10

Comparison
2,582
Frequency
Percent

Post

Table 6. Characteristics of Patients and Hospitals of the BPCI Initiative Participating Hospitals (Treatment) and Nonparticipating
Hospitals (Comparison) for Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity
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Dependent Variables
Discharge location
Home
155
5.48
335
18.43
82
5.00
1,057
40.94
Mortality
12
0.42
10
0.55
3
0.18
4
0.15
Complication
PSI 03
13
0.46
9
0.49
0
0.00
2
0.08
PSI 08
5
0.18
15
0.83
0
0.00
0
0.00
PSI 13
7
0.25
12
0.66
5
0.31
11
0.43
PSI total
23
0.81
35
1.93
5
0.31
12
0.47
PSI total = 1
21
0.74
34
1.87
5
0.31
11
0.43
PSI total = 2
2
0.07
1
0.06
0
0.00
1
0.04
Notes. *Others in race include Native Americans (0.4%), unknown (0.9%). COPD = chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; PSI= patient safety
indicator; PSI 03 is pressure ulcer; PSI 08 is in hospital fall with hip fracture; PSI 13 is postoperative sepsis; PSI total indicates incidence of PSI03,
PSI 08, or PSI 13.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database Nevada, 2013-2017

N
Patient Characteristics
Age
< 64
65–74
75–84
85 and older
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Others*
Comorbidities
Diabetes
Diabetes with complications
Hypertensions
Congestive Heart Failures
COPD
Depression
Obesity
Hospital Characteristics
Hospital Size
Small (<100 beds)
Medium (100–299 beds)
Large (> 300 beds)
Hospital Ownership
Profit
Non-Profit
County
Teaching Hospital
18.39
34.53
29.88
17.19
53.08
46.92
66.82
13.66
7.96
6.23
5.33
31.01
7.96
35.89
8.48
28.75
8.48
0.00
0.00
67.78
32.22
64.64
35.36
0.00
0.00

245
460
398
229
707
625
890
182
106
83
71
413
106
478
113
383
113
0
0
917
436
861
471
0
0

Treatment
1,332
Frequency
Percent

Pre
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3,175
1,348
216
216

148
2,388
2,255

1,338
340
2,002
392
1,464
516
0

3,438
431
289
230
351

2,377
2,362

902
1,606
1,387
844

67.00
28.44
4.56
4.56

3.09
49.84
47.07

28.23
7.17
42.25
8.27
30.89
10.89
0.00

72.55
9.09
6.10
4.85
7.41

49.84
50.16

19.03
33.89
29.27
17.81

Comparison
4,739
Frequency
Percent

2,313
442
0
0

0
1,828
931

472
695
1,086
670
470
232
327

1,864
349
269
136
137

1,363
1,392

583
931
791
450

83.96
16.04
0.00
0.00

0.00
66.26
33.74

17.13
25.23
39.42
24.32
17.06
8.42
11.87

67.66
12.67
9.76
4.94
4.98

49.47
50.53

21.16
33.79
28.71
16.33

Treatment
2,755
Frequency
Percent

6,473
1,620
437
437

192
3,730
4,620

1,689
1,649
3,394
1,754
1,475
903
978

5,888
938
655
477
572

4,239
4,291

1,759
2,772
2,509
1,490

75.89
18.99
5.12
5.12

2.25
43.67
54.09

19.80
19.33
39.79
20.56
17.29
10.59
11.47

69.03
11.00
7.68
5.59
6.71

49.70
50.30

20.62
32.50
29.41
17.47

Comparison
8,530
Frequency
Percent

Post

Table 7. Characteristics of Patients and Hospitals of the BPCI Initiative Participating Hospitals (Treatment) and Nonparticipating
Hospitals (Comparison) for Sepsis
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Dependent Variables
Discharge location
Home
225
16.89
1,138
24.01
642
23.30
2,313
27.12
Mortality
330
24.77
797
16.82
440
15.97
1,153
13.52
Complication
PSI 03
230
17.27
638
13.46
78
2.83
221
2.59
Notes. *Others in race include Native Americans (0.4%), unknown (0.9%). COPD = chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; PSI= patient safety
indicator; PSI 03 is pressure ulcer.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017

Table 8. MJRL: Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables
Pre
Dependent Variable
N

Post

Treatment
2,831

Comparison
1,818

Treatment
1,639

Comparison
2,582

Discharge location
Home

0.055 [0.228]

0.184 [0.388]

0.050 [0.218]

0.409 [0.492]

Mortality

0.004 [0.065]

0.006 [0.074]

0.002 [0.043]

0.002 [0.039]

Complication
PSI 03
PSI 08
PSI 13
PSI total

0.005 [0.068]
0.002 [0.042]
0.002 [0.050]
0.009 [0.101]

0.005 [0.070]
0.008 [0.090]
0.007 [0.081]
0.020 [0.143]

0.000 [0.000]
0.000 [0.000]
0.003 [0.055]
0.003 [0.055]

0.001 [0.028]
0.000 [0.000]
0.004 [0.065]
0.005 [0.076]

3.61 [2.47]
(1, 42)

3.87 [2.62]
(1, 36)

3.39 [2.46]
(1, 58)

2.96 [2.50]
(1, 46)

112649 [44273]
(48245, 791162)

90999 [40663]
(24830, 596396)

137906 [46689]
(53287, 587694)

95617 [44376]
(45557, 631599)

LOS
Total Charge
Average Charge

35381 [14111]
27692 [14823]
48530 [21647]
44493 [27749]
(2732, 178729)
(2854, 148029)
(5835, 243773)
(7405, 209078)
Notes. Means are reported with standard deviation in brackets. Minimum and max are reported in
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; LOS=length of stay; PSI=patient
safety indicators; PSI 03=pressure ulcer; PSI 08=in hospital fall with hip fracture; PSI 13=postoperative
sepsis; PSI total indicates incidence of PSI 03, PSI 08, or PSI 13; Total charge is weighted using the
inpatient hospital inflation rate.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017
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Table 9. Sepsis: Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables
Pre
Dependent Variable
N

Post

Treatment
1,332

Comparison
4,739

Treatment
2,755

Comparison
8,530

Discharge location
Home

0.169 [0.375]

0.240 [0.427]

0.233 [0.423]

0.271 [0.445]

Mortality

0.248 [0.432]

0.168 [0.374]

0.160 [0.366]

0.135 [0.342]

Complication
PSI 03

0.173 [0.378]

0.135 [0.341]

0.028 [0.166]

0.026 [0.159]

7.91 [6.89]
(1, 54)

7.39 [6.12]
(1, 56)

7.01 [6.43]
(1, 57)

6.72 [5.60]
(1, 60)

142782 [139256]
(15669, 1151320)

116990 [120721]
(77, 1545745)

140965 [134555]
(2163, 1236934)

119818 [115109]
(3089, 1818046)

LOS
Total Charge
Average Charge

20548 [12132]
17210 [12109]
23271 [13347]
19918 [13334]
(2986, 108137)
(19, 126669)
(1176, 166657)
(1215, 160164)
Notes. Means are reported with standard deviation in brackets. Minimum and max are reported in
parenthesis. LOS=length of stay; PSI=patient safety indicators; PSI 03=pressure ulcer; Total charge is
weighted using the inpatient hospital inflation rate.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017
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Table 10. Significance of Pre-Trend Test
P [Days x Treat ്0|Post = 0]
Dependent Variable
Home
Mortality
LOS
PSI 03
PSI 08
PSI 13
PSI total
Total Charge
Average Charge

MJRL
0.000
0.974
0.857
0.047
0.535
0.221
0.436
0.135
0.655

Sepsis
0.059
0.631
0.362
0.750
0.903
0.176
0.576
0.585
0.205

0.238
0.133
0.489
0.584
0.886
0.576
0.993
0.160

0.442
0.288
0.025
0.301
0.489
0.261
0.159
0.238

Sample Size
4,649
3,159
6,071
4,879
Hospital FE
y
y
y
y
Time FE
y
y
y
y
Patient Demographics
y
y
y
y
Hospital
y
y
y
y
Characteristics
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15
y
y
n
n
Drop 4/1/15- 7/1/15
n
n
y
y
Period:
-36 to 27 months
y
n
n
n
-33 to 30 months
n
n
y
n
-24 to 24 months
n
y
n
y
Notes. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; LOS=length of stay; PSI=patient safety
indicators; PSI 03=pressure ulcer; PSI 08=in hospital fall with hip fracture; PSI 13=postoperative sepsis;
PSI total indicates incidence of PSI03, PSI 08, or PSI 13; Total charge is weighted using the inpatient
hospital inflation rate.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017
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Table 11. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Home Discharge
Sample Size
Dependent Variable
(a) Home

Treat ൈ Post
P [Days x Treat ്0|Post = 0]

Hospital FE
Time FE
Patient Demographics
Age
< 64
75-84
85 +
Sex
Male
Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Others
Comorbidities
Diabetes
Diabetes w/ complications
Hypertension
Congestive Heart Failures
COPD
Depression
Obesity

MJRL
7,093

Sepsis
17,356

-0.080***
(0.016)

0.042**
(0.015)

0.059

0.238

y
y
y

y
y
y

-0.013 (0.014)
-0.053*** (0.008)
-0.130*** (0.011)

0.060*** (0.010)
-0.084*** (0.008)
-0.161*** (0.009)

0.040*** (0.008)

-0.011* (0.006)

-0.002
-0.036**
0.008
-0.014

(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.021)
(0.019)

0.019*
0.074***
0.037**
-0.008

(0.011)
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.014)

-0.016
-0.089***
-0.007
-0.046**
-0.062***
-0.031**
-0.012

(0.010)
(0.014)
(0.008)
(0.023)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.016)

-0.009
-0.026**
0.047***
-0.065***
-0.026***
-0.036***
-0.022*

(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.013)

Hospital Characteristics
y
y
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15
y
n
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15
n
y
Period: -24 to 24 months
y
n
Period: -33 to 30 months
n
y
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; COPD=chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017
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Table 12. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for In-Hospital Mortality
Dependent Variable
Mortality

Treat ൈ Post
P [Days x Treat ്0|Post = 0]

Hospital FE
Time FE
Patient Demographics
Age
< 64
75-84
85 +
Sex
Male
Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Others
Comorbidities
Diabetes
Diabetes w/ complications
Hypertension
Congestive Heart Failures
COPD
Depression
Obesity

MJRL
(n=7,093)
0.001
(0.003)

Sepsis
17,356
-0.053***
(0.016)

0.631

0.133

y
y
y

y
y
y

-0.001 (0.001)
0.003* (0.002)
0.017*** (0.005)

-0.051*** (0.007)
0.018** (0.007)
0.061*** (0.009)

0.000 (0.001)

0.023*** (0.006)

-0.003***
-0.002
-0.001
-0.005***

(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.001)

0.002
-0.020**
0.003
0.011

(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.011)

0.001
0.008
-0.002
-0.001
-0.002
0.001
0.000

(0.002)
(0.007)
(0.002)
(0.007)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.001)

-0.013*
-0.015**
-0.048***
0.029***
0.006
-0.034***
-0.020**

(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.010)

Hospital Characteristics
y
y
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15
y
n
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15
n
y
Period: -24 to 24 months
y
n
Period: -33 to 30 months
n
y
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; COPD=chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017
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Table 13. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Complication
Sample Size
Dependent Variable
PSI 03

MJRL
7,093

Sepsis
17,356

-

-0.036**
(0.012)

Treat ൈ Post

PSI total

P [Days x Treat ്0|Post = 0]
Treat ൈ Post
P [Days x Treat ്0|Post = 0]

Hospital FE
Time FE
Patient Demographics
Age
< 64
75-84
85 +
Sex
Male
Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Others
Comorbidities
Diabetes
Diabetes w/
Complications
Hypertension
Congestive Heart Failures
COPD
Depression
Obesity

0.584
-

0.002
(0.006)
0.576

-

y
y
y

y
y
y

0.002 (0.004)
0.005 (0.003)
0.019* (0.007)

-0.005 (0.005)
0.001 (0.005)
0.013** (0.006)

0.006 (0.002)

0.013*** (0.004)

-0.011***
-0.002
-0.01***
0.014

(0.001)
(0.006)
(0.002)
(0.012)

0.002 (0.004)
0.006 (0.009)
-0.004
0.009
0.012**
-0.003
0.003

(0.003)
(0.014)
(0.006)
(0.003)
(0.004)

0.003
-0.004
-0.023**
0.004

(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)

0.003 (0.005)
0.007 (0.005)
-0.02***
-0.007
-0.009*
-0.003
-0.003

(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.004)

Hospital Characteristics
y
y
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15
y
n
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15
n
y
Period: -24 to 24 months
y
n
Period: -33 to 30 months
n
y
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; PSI total=PSI 03 + PSI 08+PSI13;
PSI 03 is pressure ulcer; PSI 08 is in hospital fall with hip fracture; PSI 13 is postoperative sepsis; COPD
= chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017
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Table 14. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Length of In-Hospital Stay
Sample Size
Dependent Variable
LOS

Treat ൈ Post
P [Days x Treat ്0|Post = 0]

Hospital FE
Time FE
Patient Demographics
Age
< 64
75–84
85 +
Sex
Male
Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Others
Comorbidities
Diabetes
Diabetes w/ complications
Hypertension
Congestive Heart Failures
COPD
Depression
Obesity

MJRL
7,093

Sepsis
17,356

-0.069
(0.127)

-0.500**
(0.254)

0.362

0.489

y
y
y

y
y
y

0.013 (0.093)
0.400*** (0.069)
1.217*** (0.122)

-0.104 (0.135)
-0.178 (0.113)
-0.708*** (0.124)

-0.089 (0.063)

0.131 (0.089)

0.065
-0.091
0.035
0.017

(0.151)
(0.133)
(0.174)
(0.172)

0.238
-0.264
-0.029
0.147

(0.165)
(0.184)
(0.197)
(0.190)

0.166*
0.745***
-0.051
2.192***
0.454***
0.1094
0.082

(0.082)
(0.225)
(0.060)
(0.392)
(0.113)
(0.122)
(0.114)

-0.346***
0.369**
-0.762***
1.38***
0.522***
0.122
0.684***

(0.105)
(0.136)
(0.091)
(0.136)
(0.115)
(0.139)
(0.183)

Hospital Characteristics
y
y
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15
y
n
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15
n
y
Period: -24 to 24 months
y
n
Period: -33 to 30 months
n
y
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. MJRL=major joint replacement of the lower extremity; LOS=length of in-hospital stays;
COPD = chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017
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P [Days x Treat ്0|Post = 0]

Treat ൈ Post

(947.75)
(2917.48)
(1793.47)
(3072.79)
(3166.11)
(1353.15)
(3967.01)
(972.74)
(6646.95)
(1952.72)
(1540.4 8)
(2648.76)

299.15
1877.45
-3598.70**
2051.88
1889.66
3820.19**
17555.36***
-1184.22
31178.89***
8716.89***
724.34
5852.57 **

-4464.81**
7588.59**
-18618.23***
33004.5***
14200.77***
-4036.24
18697.04***

846.24
-6361.94*
4608.65
4660.65

5343.05**

-3084.80
-8351.23***
-23113.64***

(2089.54)
(2677.41)
(1710.81)
(2699.14)
(2205.23)
(2486.09)
(3990.87)

(3227.10)
(3634.55)
(4332.45)
(3638.59)

(1727.77)

(2677.82)
(2195.37)
(2387.60)

0.993
y
y
y

0.585
y
y
y
(1896.07)
(1024.88)
(1713.77)

- 13092.85**
(5021.22)

-2887.61
(1972.02)

3134.12*
3123.28**
7843.35***

Sepsis
17,356

MJRL
7,093
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Hospital Characteristics
y
y
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15
y
n
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15
n
y
Period: -24 to 24 months
y
n
Period: -33 to 30 months
n
y
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ; COPD = chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease; Total charge is weighted using the inpatient hospital inflation rate. Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017.

Hospital FE
Time FE
Patient Demographics
Age
< 64
75–84
85 +
Sex
Male
Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Others
Comorbidities
Diabetes
Diabetes w/ complications
Hypertension
Congestive Heart Failures
COPD
Depression
Obesity

Sample Size
Dependent Variable
Total Charge

Table 15. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Total Charge

Treat ൈ Post

(416.34)
(807.40)
(806.23)
(1523.89)
(949.35)
(536.27)
(1256.66)
(418.73)
(141.65)
(654.37)
(650.23)
(775.16)

2997.15***
-1877.65**
-1717.79**
486.49
35.36
-588.70
-2689.33**
-41.79
-7056.49***
-2179.38***
-370.90
-1037.59

140.09
-44.13
-1061.4***
764.51***
571.78**
-1029.5***
-210.19

-477.46
-168.24
-419.51
723.11*

712.31***

-437.92
-780.87***
-1474.4***

(0.105)
(0.136)
(0.091)
(0.136)
(0.115)
(0.139)
(0.183)

(0.165)
(0.184)
(0.197)
(0.190)

(0.089)

(0.135)
(0.113)
(0.124)

-64.83
(484.72)
0.160
y
y
y

-471.40
(877.91)
0.205
y
y
y
-237.97 (792.73)
-3473.12*** (461.53)
-8434.26*** (637.80)

Sepsis
17,356

MJRL
7,093

114

Hospital Characteristics
y
y
Drop 4/1/15-10/1/15
y
n
Drop 4/1/15-7/1/15
n
y
Period: -24 to 24 months
y
n
Period: -33 to 30 months
n
y
Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. COPD = chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease. Average charge is weighted using the inpatient hospital inflation rate. Data Source. State Inpatient Database of Nevada, 2013-2017.

P [Days x Treat ്0|Post = 0]
Hospital FE
Time FE
Patient Demographics
Age
< 64
75–84
85 +
Sex
Male
Race
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Others
Comorbidities
Diabetes
Diabetes w/ complications
Hypertension
Congestive Heart Failures
COPD
Depression
Obesity

Sample Size
Dependent Variable
Average Charge

Table 16. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Average Charge

MJRL
Findings
No findings
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant

DiD Coefficient
0.042**
-0.053***
-0.036**
-0.500**
-13092.85**
-64.83

Findings
25% increase
21.4% decrease
12% decrease in pressure ulcer
6.8% decrease
9.2% reduction
Insignificant

Sepsis
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Notes. *** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. MJRL= Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity;
DiD=difference-in-differences; LOS = length of in-hospital stays; Total charge is weighted using the inpatient hospital inflation rate.

Home
Mortality
Complication
LOS
Total Charge
Average Charge

DiD Coefficient
0.001
0.002
-0.069
-2887.61
-471.40

Table 17. Summary of Results

Table 18. Summary of Hypotheses

Hypothesis

Findings

Research Question One.
Does the BPCI initiative show positive effects on the effectiveness of hospital performance
for MJRL and sepsis?
Hypothesis 1. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the
effectiveness of hospital performance than non-participating hospitals.
H1a. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the
No
effectiveness of surgical care than non-participating hospitals.
H1a1a. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating
No
hospitals are more likely to be discharged to home than
findings
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1a1b. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to be discharged to HHS than
+
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1a1c. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative-participating
hospitals are less likely to be discharged to SNF than their
counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1a2. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are less likely to die in hospital than their
NS
counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1a3. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are less likely to have complications than their
NS
counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1b. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the
Yes
effectiveness of medical care than non-participating hospitals.
H1b1a. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to be discharged to home than
+
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1b1b. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to be discharged to HHS than
NS
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1b1c. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are less likely to be discharged to SNF than their
counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1b2. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating
+
hospitals are less likely to die in hospital than their
counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H1b3. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are less likely to have complications than their
+
counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
Research Question Two.
Does the BPCI initiative show positive effects on the efficiency of hospital performance
for MJRL and sepsis?
Hypothesis 2. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve
the efficiency of hospital performance than non-participating hospitals.
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H2a. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the
No
efficiency of surgical care than non-participating hospitals.
H2a4. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to have shorter LOS than their
NS
counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H2a5. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to have lower total charges than
NS
their counterparts in non-participating hospitals
H2a6. Patients with MJRL in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to have lower average charges
NS
than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H2b. BPCI initiative-participating hospitals are more likely to improve the
Yes
efficiency of medical care than non-participating hospitals.
H2b4. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to have shorter LOS than their
+
counterparts in non-participating hospitals.
H2b5. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to have lower total charges than
+
their counterparts in non-participating hospital
H2b6. Patients with sepsis in BPCI initiative participating
hospitals are more likely to have lower average charges
NS
than their counterparts in non-participating hospitals
Notes. NS=not significant; + indicates significantly positive; - indicates significantly negative

117

Performance
• Effectiveness
• Efficiency

• Incentives
• Penalties

Outcome based Contract
(BPCI initiative)
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(Hospital)
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Overarching Hypothesis. An agent (hospital) that has an outcome-based contract (BPCI initiative)
with the principal (CMS) is more likely to behave in interests of the principal by improving its
performance (effectiveness and efficiency).

Principal
(CMS)

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

•PCP
•Surgeon
•Other specialists
•Imaging
•Drugs

Pre-admission

Hospitalization
•PCP
•Surgeon
•Other specialists
•Imaging
•Implants & supplies
•Drugs
•Hospital stay

Figure 2. BPCI Initiative Model 2
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•PCP
•Surgeon
•Other specialists
•Imaging
•Drugs
•Home care
•Rehab facility
•Long-term care

Post-Acute Care
(PAC)

•PCP
•Surgeon
•Other specialists
•Imaging
•Drugs
•Hospital stay

Readmission or
Complication

Self
interest
Principal

Figure 3. Principal-Agent Relationship in Agency Theory
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Performs

Hire
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information

Agent

Self
interest

Employers

Government
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Patient

Health Plan

Figure 4. Traditional Principal-Agent Relationships in U.S. Medical Care

(Casalino, 2001)

Physician

Medical group

Regulator, accreditor

(+)

(-)

(+)

(-)

(-)

Length of agency relationship

Outcome measurability

Programmability

Goal conflict

Risk aversion of principal

Risk aversion of agent

Outcome uncertainty

Information system

(+)

(+)

(-)

(+)

(-)

(-)

(-)

(-)

Outcome-based
Contracts
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Notes: (+) indicates positively related; (-) indicates negatively related (Eisenhardt, 1989)

Behavior-based
Contracts

(+)

(+)

(+)

8 Propositions

Figure 5. Determining Behavior or Outcome-based Contracts based on Principal-Agency Theory

Proposition 2. When the principal has
information to verify agent behavior, the
agent is more likely to behave in interests
of the principal.

Proposition 1. When the contract between
the principal and agent is outcome based,
the agent is more likely to behave in the
interests of the principal.
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Principal

Outcome

Contract

Eisenhardt (1989)

Agent

Figure 6. Principal-Agent and Outcome Based Contract in Agency Theory

Principal
(CMS)

Effectiveness

H1
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Performance

Contract
(BPCI initiative)
Yes/No

Efficiency

H2

Agent
(Hospital)

Figure 7. Conceptual Framework of BPCI Initiative and Hospital Performance

Agent
(Hospital)

Principal
(CMS)

Contract
(BPCI initiative)
Yes/No
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H2b

H2a

H2a

H1a

Efficiency

Effectiveness

Performance

Figure 8. Conceptual Framework of BPCI Initiative and Hospital Performance for Surgical and Medical Care
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n=89

n=915

Pre-BPCI
(n=1,332)

Post-BPCI
(n=2,755)

Post-BPCI
(n=8,530)

BPCI-non participating
n=13,269

(remove outliers)

Step 3: exclusion criteria

Pre-BPCI
(n=4,739)

(n=17,445)

(remove observations
between 4/1/15 and 7/1/15)

Step 3: exclusion criteria

Step 2: Sepsis (DRG-MS 870,871,872)
(n=18,360)

BPCI-Participating
n=4,087

Step 1: Medicare Beneficiaries
(n=285,250)

SIDN 2013-2017 database

BPCI-non participating
n=4,400

n=13

n=1,123

Step 2: MJRL (DRG-MS 469,470)
(n=10,006)

Figure 9. Sample Selection
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Figure 10A. Conceptual Illustration of a Difference-in-Differences Analysis: No Association

Improved Outcome
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Figure 10B. Conceptual Illustration of a Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Improved Outcome
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Average Charge (continuous)

Total Charge (continuous)

H6 •
•

Length of Stay (continuous)

Efficiency

H5 •

H4

In-hospital Mortality (binary)

•
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Complication (binary)
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•

H1

Effectiveness

Performance

Figure 11. General Operationalized Conceptual Framework of Agency Theory
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• Hospital Characteristics
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Figure 12. Operationalized Conceptual Framework of the Study

Sepsis Care Bundles Compliance
in 2015

Other CMS Policies in case of Sepsis
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Decrease in Total Charge

Decrease in LOS

Reduce Complications

Reduce Mortality

Increase “Home”
Discharge

Performance

Contract
(BPCI initiative)

No-Pay policy on hospital-acquired
conditions (fall, pressure ulcer,
surgical site infection) in 2008
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Agent
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Figure 13. Changes in Hospital Behavior/Performance in Responding to the BPCI Initiative

Proactive Effects

Figure 14. Gainsharing Distributions Received by Partner Type, Model 2, Q4 2013-Q2 2017

0.59%

0.47%

1.02%
2.79%
6.77%

Physicians
PGPs
Hospitals
Instituional PAC
HHAs
Other
88.36%

Note: PGP=physician group practice. PAC=post-acute care. HHA=home health agency
Resource: Lewin Group (2018)
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Appendix A. Bundled Payments for Care Improvement List of Clinical Episodes for All Models
Episode Name
Major joint upper
extremity

Anchor
MS-DRG
483
239
240
241
255
256
257
474
475

Amputation
476
616
617
618
Urinary tract
infection

689
690
61
62

Stroke

63
64
65

MS-DRG Title
Major joint/limb reattachment procedure of upper extremities
Amputation for circulation system disorders
except upper limb and toe with major complications or comorbidities
Amputation for circulation system disorders except upper limb and toe
with complications or comorbidities
Amputation for circulation system disorders except upper limb and toe
without complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Upper limb and toe amputation for circulation system disorders with
major complications or comorbidities
Upper limb and toe amputation for circulation system disorders with
complications or comorbidities
Upper limb and toe amputation for circulation system disorders without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Amputation for musculoskeletal system and connective tissue disease
with major complications or comorbidities
Amputation for musculoskeletal system and connective tissue disease
with complications or comorbidities
Amputation for musculoskeletal system and connective tissue disease
without complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Amputation of lower limb for endocrine, nutrition, and metabolic
disease with
major complications or comorbidities
Amputation of lower limb for endocrine, nutrition, and metabolic
disease with
complications or comorbidities
Amputation of lower limb for endocrine, nutrition, and metabolic
disease without complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
Kidney and urinary tract infections with major complications or
comorbidities
Kidney and urinary tract infections without major complications or
comorbidities
Acute ischemic stroke with use of thrombolytic agent with major
complications or comorbidities
Acute ischemic stroke with use of thrombolytic agent with
complications or comorbidities
Acute ischemic stroke with use of thrombolytic agent without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction with major
complications or comorbidities
Intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction with complications or
comorbidities or tPA in 24 hours
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66
Chronic
obstructive
pulmonary
disease,
bronchitis/asthma

190
191
192
202
203
231
232

Coronary artery
bypass graft
surgery

233
234
235
236

Major joint
replacement of
the lower
extremity

469
470
246
247
248

Percutaneous
coronary
intervention

249
250
251
242

Pacemaker

243

Cardiac

244
222

Intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with major complications or
comorbidities
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with complications or
comorbidities
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Bronchitis and asthma with complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
Bronchitis and asthma without complications or comorbidities and
major complications or comorbidities
Coronary bypass with Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary
Angioplasty (balloon) with major complications or comorbidities
Coronary bypass with Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary
Angioplasty (balloon) without major complications or comorbidities
Coronary bypass with cardiac catheter with major complications or
comorbidities
Coronary bypass with cardiac catheter without major complications or
comorbidities
Coronary bypass without cardiac catheter with major complications or
comorbidities
Coronary bypass without cardiac catheter without major complications
or comorbidities
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity with
major complications or comorbidities
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity without
major complications or comorbidities
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure with drug-eluting stent with
major complications or comorbidities
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure
with drug-eluting stent without major complications or comorbidities
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure with
non-drug-eluting stent with major complications or comorbidities
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure with
non-drug-eluting stent without major complications or comorbidities
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure without coronary
artery stent or Acute myocardial infarction with major complications or
comorbidities
Percutaneous cardiovascular procedure without coronary artery stent or
Acute myocardial infarction without major complications or
comorbidities
Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant with major complications or
comorbidities
Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant with complications or
comorbidities
Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Cardiac defibrillator implant with cardiac catheter with Acute
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defibrillator

223
224
225
226
227
258
Pacemaker
Device
replacement or
revision

259
260
261
262

Automatic
implantable
cardiac
defibrillator
generator or lead
Congestive heart
failure

245
265
291
292
293
280

Acute
myocardial
infarction

281
282
308

Cardiac
arrhythmia

309
310

Cardiac valve

216

myocardial infarction/heart failure/shock with major complications or
comorbidities
Cardiac defibrillator implant with cardiac catheter with Acute
myocardial infarction/heart failure/shock without major complications
or comorbidities
Cardiac defibrillator implant with cardiac catheter without Acute
myocardial infarction/heart failure/shock with major complications or
comorbidities
Cardiac defibrillator implant with cardiac catheter without Acute
myocardial infarction/heart failure/shock without major complications
or comorbidities
Cardiac defibrillator implant without cardiac catheter with major
complications or comorbidities
Cardiac defibrillator implant without cardiac catheter without major
complications or comorbidities
Cardiac pacemaker device replacement with major complications or
comorbidities
Cardiac pacemaker device replacement without major complications or
comorbidities
Cardiac pacemaker revision except device replacement with major
complications or comorbidities
Cardiac pacemaker revision except device replacement with cardiac
catheterization
Cardiac pacemaker revision except device replacement without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Automatic implantable cardiac defibrillator lead and generator
procedures
Automatic implantable cardiac defibrillator lead procedures
Heart failure and shock with major complications or comorbidities
Heart failure and shock with cardiac catheterization
Heart failure and shock without complications or comorbidities and
major complications or comorbidities
Acute myocardial infarction, disease/discharged alive with major
complications or comorbidities
Acute myocardial infarction, disease/discharged alive with
complications or comorbidities
Acute myocardial infarction, disease/discharged alive without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Cardiac arrhythmia and conduction disorders with major complications
or comorbidities
Cardiac arrhythmia and conduction disorders with complications or
comorbidities
Cardiac arrhythmia and conduction disorders without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure with card
catheter with major complications or comorbidities
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217
218
219
220
221
266

Other vascular
surgery

267
252
253
254

Major
cardiovascular
procedure
Gastrointestinal
hemorrhage

237
238
377
378
379
329

Major bowel

330

Fractures femur
and hip/pelvis

331
533
534
535
536

Medical noninfectious
orthopedic

537
538
551
552
553
554

Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure with cardio
catheter with complications or comorbidities
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure with card
catheter without complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure without card
catheter with major complications or comorbidities
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure without card
catheter with complications or comorbidities
Cardiac valve and other major cardiothoracic procedure without card
catheter without complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
Endovascular Cardiac Valve Replacement with major complications or
comorbidities
Endovascular Cardiac Valve Replacement without major complications
or comorbidities
Other vascular procedures with major complications or comorbidities
Other vascular procedures with complications or comorbidities
Other vascular procedures without complications or comorbidities and
major complications or comorbidities
Major cardiovascular procedures with major complications or
comorbidities
Major cardiovascular procedures without major complications or
comorbidities
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage with major complications or comorbidities
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage with complications or comorbidities
Gastrointestinal hemorrhage without complications or comorbidities
and major complications or comorbidities
Major small and large bowel procedures with major complications or
comorbidities
Major small and large bowel procedures with major complications or
comorbidities
Major small and large bowel procedures without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Fractures of femur with major complications or comorbidities
Fractures of femur without major complications or comorbidities
Fractures of hip and pelvis with major complications or comorbidities
Fractures of hip and pelvis without major complications or
comorbidities
Sprains, strains, and disease locations of hip, pelvis and thigh with
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Sprains, strains, and disease locations of hip, pelvis and thigh without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Medical back problems with major complications or comorbidities
Medical back problems without major complications or comorbidities
Bone diseases and arthropathies with major complications or
comorbidities
Bone diseases and arthropathies without major complications or
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555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
Double joint
replacement of
the lower
extremity

461
462
466

Revision of the
hip or knee

467
468

Spinal fusion
(non-Cervical)

459
460

Hip and femur
procedures
except major
joint
Cervical spinal
fusion

480
481
482
471
472
473

Other knee
procedures

485
486
487

comorbidities
Signs and symptoms of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue
with major complications or comorbidities
Signs and symptoms of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue
without major complications or comorbidities
Tendonitis, myositis and bursitis with major complications or
comorbidities
Tendonitis, myositis and bursitis without major complications or
comorbidities
Aftercare, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue with major
complications or comorbidities
Aftercare, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue with cardiac
catheterization
Aftercare, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Fixed area, sprains, strains and disease except femur, hip, pelvis and
thigh with major complications or comorbidities
Fixed area, sprains, strains and disease except femur, hip, pelvis and
thigh without major complications or comorbidities
Bilateral or multiple major joint procedures of lower extremity with
major complications or comorbidities
Bilateral or multiple major joint procedures of lower extremity without
major complications or comorbidities
Revision of hip or knee replacement with major complications or
comorbidities
Revision of hip or knee replacement with complications or
comorbidities
Revision of hip or knee replacement without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Spinal fusion except Cervical with major complications or
comorbidities
Spinal fusion except Cervical without major complications or
comorbidities
Hip and femur procedures except major joint with major complications
or comorbidities
Hip and femur procedures except major joint with complications or
comorbidities
Hip and femur procedures except major joint without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Cervical spinal fusion with major complications or comorbidities
Cervical spinal fusion with complications or comorbidities
Cervical spinal fusion without complications or comorbidities and
major complications or comorbidities
Knee procedures with primary diagnosis of infection with major
complications or comorbidities
Knee procedures with primary diagnosis of infection with
complications or comorbidities
Knee procedures with primary diagnosis of infection without
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488
489
456
Complex nonCervical spinal
fusion

457
458

Combined
anterior posterior
spinal fusion

453
454
455

Back and neck
except spinal
fusion

518
519
520

Lower extremity
and humerus
procedure except
hip, foot, femur

492
493
494
495
496
497

Removal of
orthopedic
devices

Sepsis

498

499
870
871

complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Knee procedures without primary diagnosis of infection with
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Knee procedures without primary diagnosis of infection without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Spinal fusion except cervical with spinal curve, malignant or 9+ fusions
with major complications or comorbidities
Spinal fusion except cervical with spinal curve, malignant or 9+ fusions
with complications or comorbidities
Spinal fusion except cervical with spinal curve, malignant or 9+ fusions
without complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Combined anterior/posterior spinal fusion with major complications or
comorbidities
Combined anterior/posterior spinal fusion with complications or
comorbidities
Combined anterior/posterior spinal fusion without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Back and neck procedures except spinal fusion with major
complications or comorbidities or disc device/neurostimulator
Back and neck procedures except spinal fusion with complications or
comorbidities
Back and neck procedures except spinal fusion without complication or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Lower extreme and humerus procedure except hip, foot, femur with
major complications or comorbidities
Lower extreme and humerus procedure except hip, foot, femur with
complications or comorbidities
Lower extreme and humerus procedure except hip, foot, femur without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Local excision and removal internal fix devices except hip and femur
with major complications or comorbidities
Local excision and removal internal fix devices except hip and femur
with complications or comorbidities
Local excision and removal internal fix devices except hip and femur
without complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Local excision and removal internal fix devices of hip and femur with
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Local excision and removal internal fix devices of hip and femur
without
complications or comorbidities and major complications or
comorbidities
Septicemia with MV 96+ hours
Septicemia without MV 96+ hours with major complications or

138

Diabetes

872
637
638
639
177

Simple
pneumonia and
respiratory
infections

178
179
193
194
195
189
204

Other respiratory

205
206
207
208
186
187

Chest pain
Medical
peripheral
vascular
disorders
Atherosclerosis
Gastrointestinal
obstruction

188
313
299
300
301
302
303
388
389
390

Syncope and
collapse
Renal failure

312
682
683
684

comorbidities
Septicemia without MV 96+ hours without major complications or
comorbidities
Diabetes with major complications or comorbidities
Diabetes with complications or comorbidities
Diabetes without complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
Respiratory infections and inflammations with major complications or
comorbidities
Respiratory infections and inflammations with complications or
comorbidities
Respiratory infections and inflammations without complications or
comorbidities and major complications or comorbidities
Simple pneumonia and pleurisy with major complications or
comorbidities
Simple pneumonia and pleurisy with complications or comorbidities
Simple pneumonia and pleurisy without complications or comorbidities
and major complications or comorbidities
Pulmonary edema and respiratory failure
Respiratory signs and symptoms
Other respiratory system diagnoses with major complications or
comorbidities
Other respiratory system diagnoses without major complications or
comorbidities
Respiratory system diagnosis with ventilator support 96+ hours
Respiratory system diagnosis with ventilator support <96 hours
Pleural effusion with major complications or comorbidities
Pleural effusion with complications or comorbidities
Pleural effusion without complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
Chest pain
Peripheral vascular disorders with major complications or
comorbidities
Peripheral vascular disorders with complications or comorbidities
Peripheral vascular disorders without complications or comorbidities
and major complications or comorbidities
Atherosclerosis with major complications or comorbidities
Atherosclerosis without major complications or comorbidities
Gastrointestinal obstruction with major complications or comorbidities
Gastrointestinal obstruction with complications or comorbidities
Gastrointestinal obstruction without complications or comorbidities and
major complications or comorbidities
Syncope and collapse
Renal failure with major complications or comorbidities
Renal failure with complications or comorbidities
Renal failure without complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
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Syncope and
collapse
Renal failure

312
682
683
684

Nutritional and
metabolic
disorders
Cellulitis
Red blood cell
disorders
Transient
ischemia

640
641
602
603
811
812
69

391

Red blood cell disorders without major complications or comorbidities
Transient ischemia
Renal failure without complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
Esophagitis, gastroenteritis and miscellaneous digest disorders with
major complications or comorbidities

392

Esophagitis, gastroenteritis and miscellaneous digest disorders without
major complications or comorbidities

684
Esophagitis,
gastroenteritis
and other
digestive
disorders

Syncope and collapse
Renal failure with major complications or comorbidities
Renal failure with complications or comorbidities
Renal failure without complications or comorbidities and major
complications or comorbidities
Nutritional and miscellaneous metabolic
disorders with major complications or comorbidities
Nutrition and miscellaneous metabolic
disorders without major complications or comorbidities
Cellulitis with major complications or comorbidities
Cellulitis without major complications or comorbidities
Red blood cell disorders with major complications or comorbidities

Source: CMS (2017). BPCI Initative Episode Analytic File(XLS). Assessed 8/3/2018 at
https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/bpcianalyticfile.xlsx.
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Appendix B. Glossary of Acronyms Related to this study
Abbreviation
Meaning
ACA
Affordable Care Act
ACE
Acute Care Episode
AHRQ
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
BPCI
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
CJR
Comprehensive care for joint replacement
CMS
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
COPD
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
DiD
Difference-in-Differences
ED
Emergency Department
EGDT
Early Goal-Directed Therapy
FFS
Fee for Service
HHS
Home Health Service
HRRP
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
ICD-9-CM
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision, Clinical Modification
IP Rehab
Inpatient Rehabilitation
LOS
Length of hospital stay
MS-DRG
Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Group
NIS
National Inpatient Sample
PAC
Post-Acute Care
PCP
Primary Care Physician
PSI
Patient Safety Indicator
SIDN
State Inpatient Databases of Nevada
SNF
Skilled Nursing Facility
TJA
Total Joint Arthroplasty
THA
Total Hip Arthroplasty
TKA
Total Knee Arthroplasty
MJRL
Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity
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Appendix C. ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes for Comorbidities
ICD-9
Diabetes, uncomplicated
250.0-250.3

ICD-10
E10.0, E10.1, E10.9, E11.0,
E11.9, E12.0, E12.1, E12.9,
E13.0, E13.1, E13.9, E14.0,
E14.1, E14.9
Diabetes, complications
250.4-250.7, 250.9
E10.2-E10.8, E11.2-E11.8,
E12.2-E12.8, E13.2-E13.8,
E14.2-E14.8
Hypertension
243-244.2, 244.8, 244.9
240.9, 243.x, 244.x, 246.1,
246.8
Congestive heart failure
398.91, 402,11, 402.91,
I90.9, I11.0, I13.0, I13.2,
414.11, 414.13, 414.91,
I125.5, I42.0, I42.5-I42.9,
414.93, 428.x
I43x, I50x, P29.0
Chronic obstructive
490-492.8, 493.00-493,91,
416.8, 416.9, 490.x-505.x,
pulmonary disease
494.x-505.x, 506.4
506.4, 508.1, 508.8
Obesity
278.0
E66.x
Depression
300.4, 301.12, 309.0, 309.1,
F20.4, F31,3-F31,5, F32.x,
311
F33.x, F34.1, F41.2, F43.2
Source: Quan et al (2005). Coding algorithms for defining comorbidities in ICD-9-CM and ICD10 administrative data.
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Appendix D. ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes for Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs)
PSI
ICD-9
ICD-10
7070, 70700, 70701, 70702,
L8990, L89009, L89119,
70703, 70704, 70705, 70706,
L89129, L89139, L89149,
PSI 03
70707, 70709, 70723, 70725,
(Pressure Ulcer)
L89159, L89209, L89309,
70725
L89509, L89609, L89819,
L89899
82000, 82001, 82002,
S72019A, S72023A, S72026A,
82003,82009, 82010, 82011,
S72033A, S72036A, S72043A,
S72046A, S72099A, S72019B,
82012, 82013, 82019, 82020,
82021, 82022, 82030, 82031,
S72019C, S72023B, S72023C,
PSI 08
82032, 8208, 8209
S72026B, S72026C, S72033B,
(In Hospital Fall with
S72033C, S72036B, S72036C,
S72043B, S72043C, S72046B,
Hip Fracture)
S72046C, S72099B, S72099C,
S72109B, S72143A, S72146A,
S7223XA, S7226XA,
S72109B, S72109C, S72143B,
S72143C, S72146B, S72146C,
S7223XB, S7223XC,
S7226XB, S7226XC
0380, 0381, 03810, 03811,
A409, A411 A412, A4101,
03812, 03819, 0382, 0383,
A4102, A403, A414, A4150,
PSI 13
A413, A4151, A4152, A4153,
(Postoperative Sepsis)
03840, 03841, 03842, 03843,
03844, 03849, 0388, 0389,
A4159, A4189, A419
78552, 99591, 99592, 9980,
99802
Source: AHRQ (2017)
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